Three Essays on Environmental- and Spatial-Based Valuation of Urban Land and Housing by Liu, Lu
Utah State University
DigitalCommons@USU
All Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies
5-2010
Three Essays on Environmental- and Spatial-Based
Valuation of Urban Land and Housing
Lu Liu
Utah State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Statistics and Probability Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the
Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in All Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please
contact rebecca.nelson@usu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Liu, Lu, "Three Essays on Environmental- and Spatial-Based Valuation of Urban Land and Housing" (2010). All Graduate Theses and
Dissertations. 726.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/726
THREE ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL- AND SPATIAL-BASED 
VALUATION OF URBAN LAND AND HOUSING 
 
 
by 
 
 
Lu Liu 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 
 
of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
in 
 
Economics 
 
 
Approved: 
 
 
             
Paul M. Jakus      Arthur J. Caplan 
Major Professor     Committee Member 
 
 
             
Reza Oladi                 Frank Caliendo 
Committee Member     Committee Member 
 
 
             
Mark Brunson                            Byron R. Burnham 
Committee Member     Dean of Graduate Studies 
 
 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
Logan, Utah 
 
2010 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Lu Liu 2010 
All Rights Reserved 
  
iii 
ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on Environmental- and Spatial-Based Valuation 
 
of Urban Land and Housing 
 
 
by 
 
 
Lu Liu, Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Utah State University, 2010 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Paul Jakus 
Department: Applied Economics 
 
 
This dissertation attempts to provide a comprehensive examination on the 
non-market valuation of the effect of open space amenities and local public 
infrastructure on the value of urban land and housing with both spatial heterogeneity 
and project heterogeneity.  The demand for raw land is a derived demand for 
housing built on it. Therefore, we need to examine the land market and the housing 
market together.  On the one hand, we estimate the value of urban land in a market 
that does not satisfy the usual assumptions of a competitive market structure as well 
as incentive incompatibility issues for transaction participants, with an application to 
a Chinese regional wholesale land market.  These two violations to the traditional 
hedonic theory also generate two separate valuations on land with differentiated 
iv 
characteristics.  On the other hand, we utilize the relative plane coordinates system, 
the three-dimensional distances, as well as the aggregate weight matrix, to implement 
the spatial hedonic estimation on the high-rise residential buildings in the same 
regional housing retail market in China.  After these two steps, this dissertation, 
therefore, focuses on the profit maximization behavior of the property developer, 
which is the key role to link the factor market (i.e., the land market) and the 
commodity market (i.e., the housing market) together. Two methods are then 
employed to implement the hypothesis test on the hedonic price estimation including 
both inputs and outputs.  First, a set of partial derivatives of the profit function with 
respect to various characteristics gives us the relationship between the marginal 
valuations in the land market and in the housing market.  Second, we introduce a 
joint estimation approach that we call the spatial full information maximum 
likelihood (SFIML), which considers the land market, the housing market, and the 
property developer's profit maximization behavior all together in the estimation.  
Finally, we conduct a hypothesis test in both of these two scenarios to examine the 
validity of our linked markets assumption on the hedonic price estimation. 
(175 pages) 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
It is commonly acknowledged that modern hedonic theory should be credited to 
Rosen (1974), who proposed an equilibrium model of product differentiation.  The 
hedonic approach has seen widespread applications to help value: air quality, open / 
green space, public transportation, water proximity and quality, and planned local 
infrastructure.  Traditional hedonic theory relies upon two critical assumptions: the 
competitive market structure and "matching" property prices with the market 
participants' true valuations.  If the market, however, is characterized by a 
monopolistic seller, then we do not have a set of offer curves as the traditional 
hedonic theory predicts. Instead, we end up with only one offer function which stands 
alone in the market.  In addition, in some special cases such as an English auction 
setting, the actual sales price may not represent both the seller's and the buyer's true 
valuations since a possible auction premium may exist.  In either case, we cannot 
directly use the observed sales price to estimate the hedonic equilibrium and implicit 
marginal prices.  Under these market conditions, the sales price fails to represent the 
true valuation of the market participants, due to the monopolistic seller and the 
incentive incompatibility issue in the English auction.  To our knowledge, no study 
has been done to examine the hedonic valuation when confronting these two 
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violations to traditional assumptions of hedonic theory. 
In Chapter 2, data on the land market in China provides us with an opportunity to 
examine the two violations.  The Chinese regional land market is characterized by a 
monopolistic land seller (the local government) and multiple buyers (developers) who 
purchase land via English auction.  We are able to take advantage of these market 
features in two ways.  First, the "asking price" of the government seller is used to 
derive its true valuation, so that one can estimate the offer function of the monopoly 
seller.  On the buyer's side, the winning bid does not necessarily reflect the true 
valuation of the buyers.  But with the known asking price and winning bid, the 
incentive incompatibility properties of the English auction can be exploited to recover 
the true valuation of the buyers. 
Our empirical analysis looks at the marginal implicit values for characteristics of 
raw, developable land. The characteristics considered include development 
restrictions regarding housing density and minimum green space, in situ and planned 
infrastructure such as parks and public transportation systems, and neighborhood 
effects.  Because no equilibrium price function exists, we conduct the analysis 
separately for the land seller (the local government) and buyers (land developers).  
We find that, contrary to standard hedonic theory, the marginal implicit characteristics 
are not equal across buyers and sellers. 
The natural extension of the study in Chapter 2 is to examine the retail housing 
market, i.e., look at the hedonic equilibrium in the structures built upon the raw land 
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considered in Chapter 2.  The Chinese regional housing market consists of housing 
units in different housing projects.  Unlike the relatively "sparse" residential 
development pattern common in the US and other countries, the style of residential 
development in China is more concentrated and dense.  In fact, many large cities in 
Asia develop in a similar manner, and their residential buildings have the "high-rise" 
shape.  Over the past 20 years, high-rise residential development has expanded from 
the coastal region to the inland region, and it is currently the prevalent 
urban-development pattern in China.  The high-rise residential pattern challenges the 
traditional spatial hedonic techniques because the standard two-dimensional concept 
in space does not fit the situation well.  To our knowledge, no study has been done 
to conduct the hedonic estimation with respect to the high-rise residential pattern. 
We adapt our spatial econometric model to reflect the potential for 
three-dimensional spatial relationships within a high-rise apartment complex, as well 
as the two-dimensional spatial relationships between complexes.  Our equilibrium 
hedonic price function explains apartment sales prices as a function of 
project-specific attributes such as housing density and in situ and planned 
infrastructure such as parks and public transportation, and apartment-specific 
characteristics such as the size of the apartment and the floor on which it is located. 
While Rosen (1974) and many subsequent studies have focused on the different 
characteristics of the output, Palmquist (1989) extends the study into the 
differentiated factors of production with a focus on land.  Palmquist treats land as a 
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differentiated production input, and assumes that, this differentiated factor (land, in 
this example) is purchased by a buyer following a derived demand for the input.  To 
our knowledge, while most previous hedonic studies focus on the "final product" 
(retail housing), the critical role of the property developer has long been ignored.  In 
fact, it is the property developer that links the land and housing markets together.  
Although the studies of Palmquist (1989) and Wu (2006) (among others) have shed 
light on the theoretical link between the factor market and commodity market, to our 
knowledge no study has attempted to empirically link the derived demand for land to 
the supply of retail housing. 
Chapter 4, therefore, focuses on the profit maximization behavior of the property 
developer.  The property developer is assumed to earn a positive profit from the 
English auction where the raw land parcel is traded with the local government, 
besides the common competitive market assumption.  This profit arises from the 
premium due to the incentive incompatibility problem with the English auction, since 
the winner only needs to pay the amount at which the second highest bidder quits.  
With the developer's true valuation of land derived from Chapter 2, we test whether 
the parameters from the derived demand are consistent with those of the supply.  
Both separate estimation and joint estimation approaches are employed in the 
empirical models.  A set of partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to 
various characteristics gives us the relationship between the marginal valuations in 
the land and housing markets, which then present a link between the estimation 
5 
parameters in these two markets, and could be considered as constraints in the 
estimation parameters. 
We also use a joint estimation approach that we call the spatial full information 
maximum likelihood (SFIML), which considers the land market, the housing market 
and the property developer's profit maximization behavior all together in the 
estimation.  We use the results in the corresponding separate estimation in the 
housing market as the constraint on the SFIML parameters. 
The results of the separate estimation model reject the null hypothesis that the 
calculated constraints are valid.  In contrast, the joint estimation model fails to reject 
the null hypothesis, which provides a positive signal confirming the theoretical 
linkage in the hedonic price estimation. 
 
References 
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CHAPTER 2 
A SPATIAL HEDONIC STUDY FOR MONOPOLY SUPPLIED URBAN LAND 
 
VIA ENGLISH AUCTION: A CASE STUDY OF CHENGDU, CHINA 
 
Abstract 
This study estimates the effect of open space and local public infrastructure on 
the value of urban land in a market that does not satisfy the usual assumptions of the 
traditional hedonic theory.  Our study uses data obtained from a Chinese regional 
land market characterized by a monopolistic land seller (the local government) and 
multiple buyers (developers) who purchase land via English auction.  The "asking 
price" of the government seller is used to derive its true valuation, so that one can 
estimate the offer function of the monopoly seller.  For developers, the winning bid 
does not necessarily reflect the true valuation of the buyers due to the incentive 
incompatibility properties of the English auction.  Following Paarsch (1997), we use 
the difference between the asking price and the winning bid to calculate a "bid 
premium."  The premium is then used to recover the distribution of the buyer's true 
valuation.  Our estimates thus reveal the true marginal valuation for amenities and 
infrastructure associated with a given property by both buyers and sellers which, 
under our market conditions need not be equal because the usual hedonic equilibrium 
does not apply.  In our study of land sold for residential development in Chengdu, 
China, we find that the seller and buyers differ in the marginal valuation of these land 
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characteristics.  In addition, our study can be used to shed light on the "land 
financing" issue in China, land sales are a primary tool of local public financing. 
 
1. Introduction 
This study estimates the effect of open space and local public infrastructure on 
the value of urban land in a market that does not satisfy the usual assumptions of the 
traditional hedonic theory.  Our study uses data obtained from a Chinese regional 
land market characterized by a monopolistic land seller (the local government) and 
multiple buyers (developers) who purchase land via English auction.  We take 
advantage of these market features in two ways.  First, the "asking price" of the 
government seller is used to derive its true valuation, so that one can estimate the 
offer function of the monopoly seller.  On the buyer's side, the winning bid does not 
necessarily reflect the true valuation of the buyers.  Given the known asking price 
and winning bid, the incentive incompatibility properties of the English auction can 
be exploited to recover the true valuation of the buyers.  The implicit prices of the 
offer and bid functions reveal the true marginal valuation for amenities and 
infrastructure associated with a given property.  In our study of land sold for 
residential development in Chengdu, China, we find that the monopolistic seller and 
buyers differ in the marginal valuation of these land characteristics. 
The paper proceeds as follows: first, we briefly review the traditional hedonic 
theory under standard theoretical assumptions, along with a review of how this model 
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has been applied to the valuation of open space amenities and infrastructure.  After 
discussing the land market in China and the City of Chengdu, we present our data.  
We then discuss the properties of an English auction and its application to our study.  
Our empirical section consists of three parts: a Tobit model to estimate the auction 
premium paid by the buyers and its subsequent transformation into the distribution of 
the buyers' valuation, an empirical model for the monopolist's offer function, and, 
finally, a model of the bid function using the land buyers' derived true valuation. 
 
2. Literature Review 
It is commonly acknowledged that hedonic theory should be credited to Rosen 
(1974), who proposed an equilibrium model of product differentiation.  In a 
competitive market setting, goods are assumed to be valued for their utility-bearing 
characteristics, and the interactions of buyers and sellers over multiple attributes yield 
the hedonic equilibrium price function.  The hedonic price function is an envelope 
of the tangent points between the offer functions and the bid functions.  The hedonic 
approach has been seen widespread application so, for this study, we will initially 
focus our literature review on open / green space, public transportation, water 
proximity, and planned local infrastructure.  There are many studies that have shed 
light on our research, some of which we review below. 
Anderson and West (2006) estimate the effects of proximity to open space on 
home sales price in the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area.  They measure the 
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size of the nearest amenity of different types in acres, such as neighborhood park, 
special park, golf course, cemetery, lake.  Although many recent studies measure the 
total quantity of open space surrounding a home within a given distance or at multiple 
scales, they prefer to use the distance to the nearest open space, since they include the 
block group fixed effects, and homes in the same census block group often have the 
same overall pattern of surrounding land use.  They also calculate the distance from 
each home to the nearest CBD.  Again, home value is regressed on structural 
attributes, neighborhood characteristics as well as location, and environmental 
amenities.  Census block group data are used as control variables.  A log-log 
functional form is used in the estimation, with results showing that the value of 
proximity to open space is higher in neighborhoods that are characterized as: dense, 
near the CBD, high-income, high-crime, or home to many children.  Anderson and 
West also find that the sales price of an average home increases with the proximity to 
neighborhood parks, special parks, and golf courses.  However, they find that these 
results are sensitive to the inclusion of local fixed effects. 
Asabere and Huffman (2009) measure the relative impacts of trails, greenbelts, 
and the interaction of trails with greenbelts on home values for over 10,000 sales of 
residential property occurring in and around Bexar County, Texas.  A distinct feature 
of their study is that they use dummy variables to denote almost all the open space 
variables such as presence of a trail in the neighborhood, a greenbelt in the 
neighborhood, both trail and greenbelt, a golf course, a playground, tennis court, and 
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a swimming pool.  Actual distances from trail or greenbelt are measured based on 
the MLS database.  In addition, they also consider additional sales-related variables 
including time-of-sale in sequential months, and type of financing (conventional 
versus others).  A semi-log functional form is used in the estimation.  Their study 
shows that trails, greenbelts, and trails with greenbelts are associated with roughly 
2%, 4%, and 5% price premiums, respectively.  The authors, therefore, confirm that 
the home value would be further enhanced when greenbelts are used to buffer trails 
and hence create greenways. 
Bolitzer and Netusil (2000) examine the net effect of open space proximity on a 
home's sale price in urbanized Portland.  They include all publicly owned open 
spaces and those privately owned large open spaces that exceed 10 acres.  Public 
parks make up the majority of open spaces in this study.  Proximity to an open space, 
open-space type and distance from the house to the central business district are 
obtained using a geographic information system (GIS) database.  An "open space" 
dummy variable was created to reflect the presence of any open space within 1500 
feet of a home.  The sales price of a home is then regressed on structural 
characteristics, environmental characteristics, open space characteristics, and other 
neighborhood characteristics.    Both linear and semi-log functional forms are used 
in regression and the results from the semi-log specification are preferred.  Their 
results show that proximity to an open-space of certain type can have a positive and 
significant effect on a home's sale price in their study area, but they do not find that 
11 
the negative externalities associated with open space adjacency dominate the positive 
externalities (as was found in other empirical studies). 
Geoghegan et al. (1997) include two ecological landscape indices (diversity and 
fragmentation) to hedonic valuation on land use.  In their study, they introduce a 
diversity index based on Shannon index and a fragmentation index which is the 
perimeter to air area ratio, fractal dimension (edge to interior) and the edge length 
between land use.  They measure the two ecological indices at both a 0.1km and 1.0 
km radius surrounding each housing transaction to capture the scale issue.  Besides 
this buffer, they also consider structural characteristics (age of house, type of 
construction material, lot size, and whether lot is waterfront or not), locational 
characteristics (i.e., distance to the central business district, CBD), and accessibility 
(the distance to the nearest major road).  Their study area is the 30-mile radius of the 
Washington DC, which they think is the maximum possible commute range of the 
market. Both census data on ethnic composition and income and GIS data on streets, 
highways, and hydrological systems are used.  Without doing a tedious process of 
address-matching, they use a 3000 ft by 4000 ft size grid, and then geo-code them 
into GIS.  In addition, they use dummy variable to capture differential tax rates and 
public services.  In their regression, natural log functional form is used.  Their 
research has found that for a smaller buffer, the marginal contribution of more open 
space is both positive and significant; while for a larger buffer, the effect is both 
negative and significant. 
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Irwin (2002) addresses the identification problems in a hedonic pricing model 
due to the endogenous explanatory variables, spatial error autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity.  She distinguishes six types of open space by individuals' 
perceptions of neighboring open space, namely whether it is in a preserved state or 
developable.  She also divides the open space into land that could be developed at 
anytime (cropland, pasture, or forest) versus land that has been permanently 
preserved in some way (privately owned land whose development rights have been 
sold or land that is publicly held).  Irwin considers land ownership and land use as 
well, using a 400-meter radius around residential parcels as the study area.  She also 
considers the proportion of neighboring land that is in low, medium, and high density 
residential development and commercial or industrial land use to capture the 
externality effects of neighboring development. Distance to the two major centers in 
the study area, i.e., Washington, DC and Baltimore is measured along major roads.  
A dummy variable is used to denote whether a residential property is located within 
one mile of the airport to examine the noise disamenity as well.  In addition, several 
socioeconomic variables from the 1990 U.S. Census of Population measuring at the 
block group level and dummies for three of the four counties in the study area are 
also included. 
In Irwin's study, residential sales price is regressed on structural characteristics 
associated with the house, neighborhood / locational variables, as well as 
neighborhood land use variables.  Irwin compares log-log, semi-log functional 
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forms, and a linear version of the Box-Cox transformation.  Results show that the 
log-log and semi-log specifications do a better job than the linear model and a slight 
preference is given to the log-log model by ordinary least square estimation.  
Privately owned conservation lands, publicly owned conservation lands, nonmilitary 
open space have positive and significant effects on the value of neighboring 
residential properties relative to developable pasture land.  Notably, Irwin randomly 
draws a subset of the data to control the inefficiency of the estimates caused by the 
remaining spatial error correlation.  She first defines the nearest neighbors as parcels 
that are within 100 meters of each other and then uses 200, 400, and 600 meters of 
each other to test model robustness.  She finds that the spillover effects from 
preserved open space are significantly greater than those associated with developable 
farmland and forest, and that pasture land generates a significantly greater spillover 
effect on residential property values than that of neighboring forests. 
Leggett and Bockstael (2000) estimate the effects of water quality on residential 
land values along the Chesapeake Bay, in Anne Arundel County, Maryland.  They 
use fecal coliform bacteria, which has serious human health implications, as a 
measure of water quality.  They collect data for sales of waterfront property between 
July 1993 and August 1997 from the State of Maryland's Tax Assessment data base.  
Distance is measured from a parcel to the closest water quality monitoring stations.  
The authors calculate an inverse distance-weighted average of fecal coliform counts 
based on data from the nearest three monitoring stations for each waterfront property.  
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In addition, the appraised value of the structure by the tax assessors is also included 
in the regression.  They include lot size and its square as explanatory variables as 
well.  Commuting distances to the nearby cities (Annapolis, Baltimore, and 
Washington, DC) are measured using ARC/INFO software along road networks 
digitized in the Census Bureau's Tiger Line Files.  Additional variables include 
black population as a percent of total population and percent of owner occupied 
housing in the Census block group. 
In the regression, log-log, semi-log, inverse semi-log, and linear functional forms 
are compared.  Leggett and Bockstael estimate two alternative dependent variables 
for each of the four specifications: one is market transaction price minus assessed 
value of the structure and, the other one is the market transaction price itself.  The 
first one is explained as the "residual" land price. They use ordinary least squares to 
estimate all of the eight specifications, and find that both heteroscedasticity and 
spatial autocorrelation are in the OLS results.  They argue that it is difficult to 
resolve these two problems at the same time, so they first focus on four specifications 
which do not exhibit heteroscedasticity and then re-estimate these specifications 
using spatial error model to correct spatial correlation.  In the end, the inverse 
semi-log functional form is chosen to conduct a comparative study in welfare change.  
The model indicates that improvements in water quality can have a positive and 
significant effect on property values. 
Lutzenhiser and Netusil (2001) estimate the effect of proximity to different open 
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space types on a home's sale price in the city of Portland, Oregon.  Open spaces are 
assigned to one of five categories: urban parks, natural area parks, specialty 
parks/facilities, golf courses, and cemeteries.  Dummy variables were created to 
reflect the interaction between seven different zones that range in size from 200 to 
300 feet and the open space types.  Home prices are regressed on structural 
characteristics, environmental characteristics, neighborhood characteristics.  The 
estimated effects are composed of three factors: the open space variable interacted 
with distance, and acreage and acreage squared interacted with open space type.  
Box-Cox transformation of the dependent variable is used in the estimation, where a 
maximum likelihood value for the parameter λ in the transformation is estimated.  
Their findings show that homes located within 1,500 feet of a natural area park, 
where more than 50% of the park is preserved in native and/or natural vegetation, 
have the largest increase in sale price.  In addition, Lutzenhiser and Netusil show 
that natural area parks require the largest acreage to maximize sale price, and 
specialty parks are found to have the largest potential effect on a home's sale price. 
Mahan et al. (2000) use the hedonic property price model to estimate the value of 
wetland amenities in the Portland, Oregon, for the metropolitan area with over 14,000 
home sales records.  Arc/Info GIS is used to generate the data, and wetland 
characteristics are based on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's National Wetlands 
Inventory in Oregon.  Their major land-cover categories include forested, 
scrub-shrub, emergent-vegetation, open-water wetlands, lakes and rivers or streams.  
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They record the size in acres of nearest wetland of any type (excluding lakes, rivers, 
and streams) and use a dummy variable to denote the type of nearest wetland.  A 
raster system is used to calculate the Euclidean distance in feet from the centroid of 
the tax lot to the nearest edge of a feature, where all data are arranged in grid cells 
(52-feet square for each).  They also measure the natural log of distance to the 
nearest open water linear wetland, water areal wetland, stream, river, lake, and 
improved public park.  Housing prices are regressed on environmental amenities 
associated with a specific location, structural characteristics, neighborhood 
characteristics, and market segment variables.  Notable neighborhood characteristics 
include the tax rate, distance to a central business district, a dummy variable for light 
traffic, elevation of property above sea level, slope of property as a percent, natural 
log of the distance in feet to nearest industrial zone, nearest commercial zone, and 
quality of view as indicated by county assessor (range 0-9, 0 if no view).  Prices are 
logged in order to implement least squares regression in estimating the hedonic price 
function. 
Two models are estimated based on different assumptions.  In model 1, 
characteristics of the nearest wetland (size, distance, type) are assumed to affect 
property value; while in model 2, the distance to the nearest wetland of each type is 
assumed to influence property values.  Their results show that increasing the size of 
the nearest wetland by one acre would increase a property's value by $24.39, while 
decreasing the distance to the nearest wetland by 1,000 feet would increase a 
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property's value by $436.17.  In addition, the type of wetland does not appear to 
matter to nearby residents. 
Besides the literature that we have discussed above, some other notable examples 
of such studies include (but not limited to): Bates and Santerre (2001), Geoghegan 
(2002), Provencher et al. (2008), Sander and Polasky (2009), Schulz and Waltert 
(2009), and Shultz and King (2001).  While most hedonic studies choose housing 
price as the research basis (i.e., the dependent variable in the regression), there are 
some studies that choose the value of land as the target variable.  Since the structure 
of housing itself is an important factor that affects the housing price, for our study 
perhaps the value of raw land is a better basis for evaluating the open-space impact on 
property value.  A good example is Cheshire and Sheppard (1995). 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) estimate the capitalization of the value of the 
location-specific characteristics into land prices.  Unlike the conventional approach 
which treats urban rent as the price of pure land, they argue that land itself is a 
composite good which embodies neighborhood, environmental characteristics and 
local public goods.  They use data from Reading and Darlington during a 
comparatively stable period in the British housing market. The 1981 Census of 
Population is used to provide data of neighborhood characteristics.  They also 
measure the accessibility of each house to the bus network as well as roads of 
different classes.  They suggest that larger roads may increase the housing value 
since they provide better accessibility and more importantly, the possible conversion 
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to commercial use.  Accessible land amenity, non-accessible land amenity, percent 
of land in accessible open space, and percent of land in inaccessible open space are 
recorded in a 1 kilometer square around each structure. 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) construct a very flexible land rent function, which 
uses an exponential form to regress the land rent on distance from town centre and 
angle of deflection from East.  They suggest this form because they think it could 
allow for multiple radial asymmetries in land rents to emerge via the estimated 
parameters.  This land rent function is then incorporated into the hedonic model 
where the Box-Cox functional form is used. The rental price is regressed on structural 
or location-specific characteristics, the quantity of land included with structure, set of 
indices of characteristics that are dichotomous, set of indices of characteristics that 
are continuously variable and the land rent function.  One distinct feature is that they 
include the effect of closely correlated variables within one variable to resolve the 
colinearity between characteristics.  They include both the congestible amenities and 
structure characteristics since they suggest that, in general they will not be correlated 
due to the "neighborhood" nature.  Their findings show that, the rent does not 
monotonically decline from the CBD, but it increases in certain directions. 
A few authors have found that proximity to public transportation or roads and 
highways can have a significant impact on property values.  The effect is complex: 
good access to such infrastructure can make daily life more convenient, but it may 
also be associated with disameneties such as traffic noise and increased crime.  
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Gibbons and Machin (2003) evaluate the economic benefits of transport access, 
noting both the positive and negative impacts of proximity to a railway line.  They 
distinguish between proximity to a railway line and the distance to a station to 
separate out environmental and transport access effects. Their research confirms that 
benefits of station proximity and high service frequencies are both capitalized in 
property prices.  Nelson (1982) also reviews nine studies of the effect of highway 
noise, finding that highway noise levels decline to background levels within roughly 
1,000 feet of a highway so that the effect on property values is contained to a 
relatively small segment of a market.   
We now summarize the literature reviewed thus far.  In these studies, open space 
has been interpreted very broadly as parks, wetlands, trails, rivers, creeks, or even 
unused land, and are normally measured in three ways.  The first method uses only 
proximity, which is commonly calculated by the Euclidean distance (in feet or meters) 
from the centroid of the property to the nearest edge (or centroid as well) of a feature.  
The second method is to use dummy variables to show the existence of a feature 
within certain range of the property, e.g., within 100 feet, 1000 meters, and so on.  
The third approach is to combine a measure of proximity with a measure of size, 
where size of each feature is calculated by acreages or square meters.  Other 
locational characteristics, such as distance to the central business district or 
employment centers in other nearby cities, are also frequently included.  With regard 
to the functional form, it appears that the choice of functional forms is simply an 
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empirical issue.  Normally, linear, semi-log, and log-log functional forms are used 
and compared. Sometimes, Box-Cox transformation is also used to derive a more 
flexible functional form.  Most studies use a combination of property sales data, GIS 
data (on streets and highways, hydrological systems, etc.), and the Census data (on 
both ethnic composition and income, etc.), which demonstrates the data requirements 
of hedonic studies.  In regard to the valuation, sales price of a residential property is 
commonly regressed on structural characteristics, environmental characteristics, open 
space characteristics, and other neighborhood characteristic, as well as market 
segment variables. 
While much of the hedonic literature uses a static approach, some hedonic 
studies involve data gathered over time.  As Freeman (1993) has proposed, most 
environmental goods are time-variant and therefore may be lead to different price 
estimates over time.  Riddel (2001) argues that if the time needed for full realization 
of amenity value is sufficiently long, then one should incorporate a time trend in the 
estimation.  Common approaches to the time issue are to deflate sales price by some 
kind of housing price index (for example, Bolitzer and Netusil, 2000; Lutzenhiser and 
Netusil, 2001) or the consumer price index (for example, Geoghegan, 2002; Leggett 
and Bockstael, 2000).
 
 The choice of methods is, once again, an empirical issue. 
As deflating by HPI appears to be one of the standard approaches, Diewert et al. 
(2010) argue that the housing price index needs to be decomposed into land and 
structure components, casting some light on the empirical difficulties of the prevalent 
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use of HPI.  In addition, the time-dummy method is also very popular in hedonic 
studies (see the discussion by Melser, 2005).  For example, Provencher et al. (2008) 
include annual dummy variables to represent the temporal shifts in the residential 
property market. 
In contrast to the previous studies, which focused on property values for already 
developed land, an important extension of Rosen's framework was presented by 
Palmquist (1989).  Palmquist treats land as a differentiated production input and 
assumes that, this differentiated factor (land, in this example) is purchased by a buyer 
following a derived demand for the input.  The supply side is similar to the Rosen's 
(1974) model, but Palmquist separates the characteristics vector into two parts: in 
addition to the usual assumption of exogenously determined characteristics, some 
characteristics could be endogenously determined by the buyer.  The bid function for 
raw land hence arises from the derived demand for existing exogenous characteristics, 
as well as those characteristics that can be manipulated. 
Traditional hedonic theory is based on two critical assumptions: the competitive 
market structure and the matching property prices with the market participants' true 
valuations.  However, if the market is characterized by a monopolistic seller, then 
we do not have a set of offer curves as the traditional hedonic theory predicts.  
Instead, we end up with only one offer function which stands alone in the market (see 
Fig. 2.1).  In addition, in some special cases such as an English auction setting, the 
actual sales price will not represent the market participants' true valuations since 
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possible auction premium may exist (see Fig. 2.2).  In these scenarios, we cannot 
directly use the observed sales price to estimate the hedonic price function because it 
fails to represent the true valuation of the market participants, due to the monopolistic 
seller and the incentive incompatibility issue for all the participants in the English 
auction.  To our knowledge, no study has been done to examine sales of property 
when confronting these two violations to the traditional assumptions of the hedonic 
pricing theory. 
 
3. Market Setting and Data 
3.1. The Land Market in China 
The land market in China provides us with an opportunity to examine the two 
violations to traditional hedonic theory mentioned above.  In China, all land is 
owned by either the central government or local government, although the precise 
entity holding ownership is usually not specified.  The sale of land for development 
is in essence a long term lease, with the term varying from 40 to 70 years.  The 
maturity for residential use land is 70 years, which is a time period long enough to 
have generated an active real estate market for developers and private citizens 
seeking housing.  Currently the most popular transaction method for private 
development in the "wholesale" land market is an auction.  Two types of auction are 
used in the market: a Type 1 auction is held in an auction hall at a particular time, 
with the land sale completed later that same day.  In contrast, a Type 2 auction  
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Fig. 2.1. A Monopolistic Supplier in the Hedonic Equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Possible Bidders' Premium in the Hedonic Equilibrium 
 
 
 
publicly posts the current highest bid, but allows bidders to repeatedly submit new 
bids over a longer period of time (e.g., two weeks).  In essence, both approaches 
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represent an open ascending-bid auction, better known as an English Auction. 
In many cities in China, an authority called the "developable land reserve center" 
processes land for development.  Land becomes available for development in two 
ways.  First, the local government can engage in renewal of an aging city center by 
paying the original residents to move out, or allocating residents to alternative 
(generally larger and newer) housing units; old buildings are then dismantled prior to 
selling the land for new development.  Another important source of developable 
land is agricultural land located in the suburban regions of a city.  Although strict 
restrictions govern conversion of agricultural land, the cost of converting agricultural 
land into developable land reserve is still much lower than land located in the central 
portion of a city.  The revenue generated from all such land sales is an important 
source of local public financing (at present, there is no property tax in China).
1
 
 
3.2. The City of Chengdu 
The city of Chengdu is the capital city of Sichuan Province which lies in the 
southwestern part of mainland China.  It is situated at the western edge of the 
Sichuan Basin, about 1500 kilometers southwest of Beijing.  With nearly 13 million 
official residents, Chengdu is the fourth largest city in China and serves as the most 
important economic, transportation and communication hubs in southwestern China.  
The most urbanized part of the city consists of 4 concentric ring roads, with a fifth 
                                                             
1 The central government and local government share the land sales revenues. 
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ring road under construction.  It is expanding in nearly all directions via planned and 
in situ mass transportation modes (a planned subway system and an already 
well-developed highway system).  Further, Chengdu is a standard monocentric city 
lying in a plain, which frees us from concerns regarding heterogeneity in hypsography. 
Chengdu also has very active markets in both developable land and residential 
housing but, as an inland city, it is subject to less speculation than the coastal cities. 
The natural boundary of the metropolitan area is within the fourth ring road, 
composed of about 600 square kilometers, though in some directions urbanization 
goes beyond the fourth ring area (see Fig. 2.3).  Areas to the northwest, west, south, 
and southeast of the city center have access to high speed, low-congestion roads with 
easy access to the main city; they are also rich in natural open space amenities.  
Expansion to the west of the city center is strictly restricted due to farm land 
protection.  Thus, most future expansion will be to the north, east, and south. 
 
3.3. Data description 
We have obtained all government land transaction records from the Bureau of 
Land and Resources Chengdu.  The data set consists of 450 observations of land 
sales for residential development between January 2004 and October 2009.  Parcel 
locations in the official sales record were manually mapped to GIS coordinates; 100 
parcels either could not be located with precision or were located outside our study 
area and were dropped from the data set, leaving 350 land sales for residential  
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Fig. 2.3. Metropolitan Area of Chengdu 
 
 
 
development.  Fig. 2.4 shows the locations of the parcels in the data set.  Some 17% 
of parcels were located inside the first ring road, 10% between the first and second 
ring roads, 34% between the second and third, 18% between the third and fourth; 21% 
of parcels were located outside of the fourth ring road.  In addition, we also 
distinguish parcels by locations within the eleven administrative districts making up 
the study area of Chengdu city. All administrative districts are bisected by more than 
two ring roads, allowing us to use these two kinds of variables to capture unobserved 
neighborhood effects for any given parcel. 
Each transaction record provides information about the transaction date, the type  
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Fig. 2.4. Spatial Distribution of Land Sales 
 
 
 
of auction governing the transaction, the area of the parcel, the per unit area 
transaction price as well as the asking price listed by the local government. Prices are 
measured as RMB￥ per square meter.2  Fig. 2.5 shows the spatial distribution of 
the unit land transaction price over the study area, both in 3-D and perpendicular 
views.  It is easy to discern that the highest land prices lie in the center of the city, 
which is consistent with the prediction of a monocentric urban model.  Land parcels 
directly south of the city center appear to have a higher price than other parcels  
                                                             
2 The standard "posted" price unit used for land sales in China is ￥10,000 
per Chinese acre (roughly 666.667 m
2
) . 
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Fig. 2.5. Distribution of the Log Values of Land Sales Price over the Study Area 
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Table 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Transaction Record 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Asking price (￥/ m2) 4435.430 3899.998 3732.432 
Sales price (￥/ m2) 8220.774 5999.997 9582.095 
Parcel Size (m
2
) 50777.200 27799.290 112558.900 
Single plot (1=yes) 87.4% -- 0.332 
Type 1 Auction (1=yes) 82.9% -- 0.377 
Type 2 Auction (1=yes) 17.1% -- 0.377 
Maximum Plot Ratio  4.089  4.000  1.607  
Maximum Structural Ratio  0.325  0.300  0.085  
Minimum Green Ratio  0.264  0.250  0.050  
 
 
 
located with the same distance from the city center, but that is likely because a future 
central business district is currently under construction between the 3
rd
 ring road and 
the 4
th
 ring road in the south. 
Land offered for sale by the government is frequently accompanied by detailed 
development restrictions.  For example, the density of a parcel is restricted by 
maximum values for Plot Ratio, the ratio of total floor area (also known as 
construction area) to the land parcel area; the Structural Density Ratio, the ratio of the 
total base area of the building to the land parcel area.  Structural Density essentially 
restricts the footprint of a building, whereas the Plot Ratio limits the overall area of a 
multistory building.  Finally, another important development restriction is the Green 
Ratio, the minimum ratio of the open space area to the land parcel area. The statistics 
for these measures are reported in Table 2.1. 
We also include five sources of open space amenities and local infrastructure that 
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Proximity and Aggregate 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Proximity 
   
Park Proximity (m) 1834.374 1260.185 1672.456 
Hospital Proximity (m) 2015.939 1172.571 2318.161 
Subway Station Proximity (m) 3110.657 1778.537 3523.823 
River Proximity (m) 1591.718 1036.565 1673.176 
Road Proximity (m) 437.529 261.535 758.167 
Aggregate 
   
Park Level 0.115 0.121 0.039 
Hospital Level 0.111 0.095 0.064 
Subway Station Level 0.006 0.006 0.003 
River Level 0.205 0.211 0.048 
Road Level 8.908 9.199 2.314 
 
 
 
might affect the value of land for residential development. The statistics for these 
variables are reported in Table 2.2.  Urban amenities may include public parks, or a 
view of one of the many rivers flowing through Chengdu.  Infrastructure that might 
be important to development decisions include accessibility to highways and the 
major roads network in the study area, as well as subway stations planned for the near 
future, or hospitals.
3
  We capture these influences using two different measures: for 
some variables, such as a view of the river or distance to the nearest subway station, a 
simple proximity measure (distance) may be appropriate.  For other variables such 
as accessibility to public parks or hospitals, a simple proximity variable might not be 
enough to capture the major value associated with accessibility.  Instead, an 
                                                             
3 We include only publicly owned hospitals in Chengdu. 
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aggregate variable that captures the scale of amenities or infrastructure (the number 
of hectares of a park or beds in a hospital) may prove to be a better measure.  To 
some extent, the precise measurement being used—proximity or aggregate—is an 
empirical matter, so we have calculated both for use in the analysis.  Measures of 
proximity simply capture the shortest distance to the amenity or infrastructure, 
measured in meters using the Haversine Formula.
4
  All proximity values are logged 
to take care of the scale issue (also see for example, Mahan et al., 2000).  For 
aggregate measures we use a weighting formula that "discounts" amenities or 
infrastructure located further away from the parcel.  For example, our aggregate 
measure of K public parks associated with a land parcel located at latitude u and 
longitude v is, 
a(u,v) =       k/zk                                      (2.1) 
where a(u,v) measures the public park aggregate, ak is the size of the k
th
 park in 
square meters, and zk is the distance from land parcel to the k
th
 park.  In addition to 
public parks, this calculation was also completed for hospitals (ak = beds in the k
th
 
hospital), subway stations (ak = 1 for each station), river locations (ak = 1 for 1500 
river locations) and major roads (ak = 1 for 70,826 road locations).  The aggregate 
measures for subway stations, river locations, and roads are akin to the method used 
                                                             
4 The Haversine formula calculates the distance between any two points on a 
sphere.  Haversine distance is usually obtained in the following steps: R = 
earth's radius (mean= 6,371km), Δlat = lat2 − lat1, Δlong = long2 − long1, a = 
sin²(Δlat/2) + cos(lat1) × cos(lat2) × sin²(Δlong/2), c = 2 × 
arcsin{min[1,sqrt(a)]}, d = R × c.  All angles are measured in radians. 
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by Gibbons and Machin (2003), where we capture not just the positive amenity of 
accessibility but also any disamenities that might be associated with crime (subway 
stops) or noise (roads).  That is, high values of the aggregate road or subway 
measures may either positively or negatively affect parcel values, whereas high 
values of the aggregate river measure may be associated with the amenity of being 
surrounded on many sides by water. 
 
4. English Auctions 
English auctions are known to have an incentive incompatibility problem in that 
participants, including the winner, need not reveal their true valuations according to 
the auction mechanism.
5
  In an auction setting, the market involves competition only 
on one side: a single seller versus several potential buyers.  For the seller, the 
situation is relatively simple. As the seller announces an asking price, its true 
valuation can be derived from Riley and Samuelson's (1981) formula based on its 
asking price as well as the distribution of the buyer's valuation.
6
  The situation is 
more complicated for bidders.  An English auction is equivalent to Vickrey's second 
price sealed auction in the sense that the highest bidder (presumed to be the bidder 
with the highest true valuation) wins.  However, in Vickrey's second price sealed 
                                                             
5 In some auction studies, a player's reservation price (or reservation value) 
denotes its true valuation; while in others, they are not the same. To avoid 
possible confusion, we do not use the term "reservation price" in this study. 
6 In some auction studies, the asking price is referred to as the "reserve 
price." 
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auction, the winner's valuation is known and the winner only pays the second-highest 
valuation as the rule requires.  Although in an English auction the winning bid 
asymptotically approaches the second-highest valuation, the winner's true valuation 
remains unobservable.
7
  We explore some details in English auction with a focus on 
the market participants' true valuations below. 
Riley and Samuelson (1981) present a method to derive the optimal asking price 
of the seller in an English auction. Their approach is implemented in three steps.  In 
the first step, Riley and Samuelson derive the expected revenue of the seller. They 
start their derivation from the buyer, and define the buyer's expected gain as the 
product of true valuation, v, and probability of winning, minus the expected payment.  
For buyer i, its non-cooperative equilibrium bid Θi, is a function of true valuation vi, 
hence Θi = Θ(vi).  Consider a particular potential buyer, denoted by "buyer 1," who 
bids according to Θ1 = Θ(v).  As Milgrom and Weber (1982) have shown that, when 
there are least two players to bid in an English auction, the dominant bidding strategy 
is Θ(v) = v.8  Assuming that there are np potential bidders (players) in the auction, 
buyer 1 wins only when all other  np - 1 buyers bid less than Θ(v).  Let the 
                                                             
7 Empirically, the English auction winner pays the second-highest valuation 
plus the last increment in the auction, with the last increment asymptotically 
approaching zero. 
8 Note that for the winner, even its dominant strategy is to bid according to its 
true valuation, the winner does not necessarily need to pay according to its 
true valuation. Riley and Samuelson (1981) have similar argument, and they 
call such bidding strategy as the "optimal strategy" of the buyers. Therefore, as 
a result of the auction (not strategy), Θ(v) = v holds only for the losers in the 
auction. This is commonly referred to as "loser tells the truth." 
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cumulative distribution function, F(v), show the probability a buyer has a true 
valuation less than or equal to v. Given the independently identical distribution (i.i.d) 
assumption, buyer 1 wins with the probability of 
1
)]([
pnvF .
9
  Therefore, buyer 1's 
expected gain in the auction is, 
Π(v, v1) = v1 × 
1
)]([
pnvF  - P(v)                                 (2.2) 
where P(v) is buyer 1's expected payment. 
Buyer 1's optimal choice according to the bidding strategy of Θ(v) is v = v1, thus 
at v = v1, the following first order condition must hold: 
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Let us now introduce the buyer's threshold valuation regarding the auction object, r, 
below which it is not profitable to bid.
10
 Thus, the following participation constraint 
must hold as well: 
Π(r, r) = r × 
1
)]([
pnrF  - P(r) = 0                        ( (  (2.4) 
Therefore, for all v1 ≥ r, Eq. (2.3) can be rewritten as, 
                                                             
9 The event "buyer 1 wins" is equivalent to the event "all other np - 1 potential 
buyers fail." Note that the probability of a potential buyer, whose valuation is 
less than v, is F(v). Then, according to the i.i.d. assumption, the probability of 
"all other np - 1 potential buyers fail" is 
1
)]([
pnvF . 
10 We call r the threshold valuation by meaning that if the buyer's valuation is 
exactly r (v = r), then its expected profit is zero. Then for those buyers whose 
valuation is greater than r, they are anticipating some positive level of profit.  
However, as the buyer increases its bid in the auction, such expected profit is 
gradually consumed. Finally, when the buyer bids at its true valuation (i.e., the 
maximum amount it can bid), the expected profit becomes zero again.  
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1
1)(
v
vP


 = v1 ×
1
1
1)]([
dv
vFd p
n 
                                    (  (2.5) 
Buyer 1's expected payment is obtained by integrating Eq. (2.5) and using Eq. (2.4) as 
a boundary condition, 
P(v1) = v1 × 
1
1)]([
pnvF  - 
1 1
)]([
v
r
n
dvvF p                             ((2.6) 
Now, for the seller, both v1 and P(v1) are random variables, but with known 
distribution. Hence, the seller's expected revenue from buyer 1 is E[P(v1)], as 
follows: 
E[P(v1)] = dvvFvF
dv
vdF
v
v
r
np })]([]1)(
)(
{[
1


                       ( (2.7) 
where v  is the maximum value that the random variable v can take, i.e., F( v )=1.
11
  
Since the seller has no private information about the potential buyers beyond the 
distribution of their true valuation, the seller uses "equal treatment" regarding all np 
buyers, i.e., every buyer might be buyer 1. Therefore, the seller's expected revenue 
from buyer 1 is, 
 np × E[P(v1)] = np × dvvFvF
dv
vdF
v
v
r
np })]([]1)(
)(
{[
1


              (|(2.8) 
The second step that Riley and Samuelson (1981) implement is to derive the 
buyer's equilibrium bidding strategy.  Assume that the seller announces an asking 
price, Θ0, which is the minimum amount that the seller would accept in the auction.  
Obviously, only those potential buyers who have true valuation v > Θ0 would 
                                                             
11 Note that v  is the hypothetical boundary of the distribution F(v), which 
predicts the event that "every buyer fails." In another word, there would be no 
winner at v = v . 
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participate in the auction.  From the buyer's view point, the expected payment is 
hence, 
P(v) = Prob {the buyer is the winner} × Θ(v)                    /(2.9) 
Solving Θ(v) from Eq. (2.9) yields the buyer's equilibrium bidding strategy. 
The third step that Riley and Samuelson (1981) implement is to derive the seller's 
optimal asking price.  In Eq. (2.8), we do not consider the case that the auction fails.  
When the true valuations of all buyers are less than r, then no buyers will participate 
in the auction. The probability of such case is p
n
rF )]([ . Then, the seller would have 
the "gain" of its own true valuation, v0. Thus, we could construct the seller's "total" 
expected return, TR, as follows: 
E[TR] = v0 × 
pnrF )]([  + np × dvvFvF
dv
vdF
v
v
r
np })]([]1)(
)(
{[
1


       ((2.10) 
Differentiating Eq. (2.10) with respect to r, we obtain the optimal value of the asking 
price, 
np × [v0 ×
dr
rdF )(
 - r ×
dr
rdF )(
 
- F(r) + 1] × 
1
)]([
pnrF  = 0             |(2.11) 
Rearranging Eq. (2.11), we have: 
v0 = r - [1 - F(r)] / f(r)                                        (2.12) 
In Eq. (2.12), F(r) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF), and f(r) is the 
probability density function (PDF). Note that the number of potential buyers has been 
eliminated. Therefore, to solve for the seller's true valuation v0, we only need 
information about the distribution of the buyer's valuation as well as the asking price 
announced by the seller. 
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The true valuation held by the winner is a bit more complicated to obtain.  
Based on Riley and Samuelson's (1981) study, we use three steps to derive the 
winner's true valuation.  The first step is to link the true valuation of the winner and 
the second-highest bidder.  We denote the true valuations of the winner and the 
second-highest bidder by v1 and v2, respectively. Since Eq. (2.6) holds for every 
potential buyer in the auction, we have: 
P(v2) = v2 × 
1
2 )]([
pnvF  - dvvF
v
r
np

2 1
)]([                            |(2.13) 
Similarly to Eq. (2.9), we can write the second-highest bidder's expected payment as, 
P(v2) = Prob {the buyer is the second-highest bidder} × Θ(v2)        |(2.14) 
Then, what is the probability of a buyer being the second-highest bidder? We 
now divide all potential buyers into three groups: the winner, the second-highest 
bidder, and other buyers. All other buyers have their true valuations less than v2, with 
probability
2
2 )]([
pnvF . In addition, the winner wins only when the second-highest 
bidder's true valuation is less than v1. This is given by probability F(v1).  Therefore, 
the total probability can be expressed as follows: 
Prob {the buyer is the second-highest bidder} = 
2
2 )]([
pnvF  × F(v1)    |(2.15) 
Combining Eqs. (2.13) to (2.15), we have: 
v2 × 
1
2 )]([
pnvF  - dvvF
v
r
np

2 1
)]([  = 
2
2 )]([
pnvF  × F(v1) × Θ(v2)          (2.16) 
Since "loser tells the truth," we have: Θ(v2) = v2. Therefore, Eq. (2.16) can be 
rewritten as: 
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v2 × 
1
2 )]([
pnvF  - dvvF
v
r
np

2 1
)]([  = 
2
2 )]([
pnvF  × F(v1) × v2            (|(2.17) 
The term dvvF
v
r
np

2 1
)]([  cannot be directly integrated. However, according to the 
Fundamental theorem of calculus, we have: 
2v

{ dvvF
v
r
np

2 1
)]([ } = 
1
2 )]([
pnvF                                  |(2.18) 
Thus, we differentiate both sides of Eq. (2.17) with respect to v2, after rearrangement, 
we obtain the link between true valuations of the winner and the second-highest 
bidder, as follows: 
F(v2) × F(v1) + v2 × (np - 2) × f(v2) × F(v1) = v2 × (np - 1) × F(v2) × f(v2) 
 |                                                         (2.19) 
Eq. (2.19) in fact shows the probability relationship between v1 and v2.  The 
English auction winner pays the second-highest valuation plus the last increment in 
the auction. However, the increment in the auction is usually very small. Hence, in an 
English auction the winning bid asymptotically approaches the second-highest 
valuation.  Denoting the actual sales price (winning bid) by s, we have v2 ≈ s.  
After obtaining the second-highest valuation v2, the number of potential buyers np is 
yet unknown. Therefore, our second step to uncover v1 is to find np. 
As Paarsch (1997) has pointed out, a measure of potential competition in the 
auction is notoriously difficult, and often impossible. With the knowledge of the 
"actual bidders," whose true valuations are no less than the asking price proposed by 
the seller, Paarsch uses a conditional relationship to map out the potential competition 
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upon the number of actual bidders.  However, we do not have such information 
about the actual bidders. Recall that in Eq. (2.8), we have presented the expected 
revenue to the seller when the auction is successful.  In real world, the seller gets the 
actual sales price (winning bid) as the result of a successful auction. Therefore, we 
have: 
np × dvvFvF
dv
vdF
v
v
r
np })]([]1)(
)(
{[
1


  = s                       |(2.20) 
Solving np from Eq. (2.20),
12
 we obtain a measure of potential competition (note that 
v  is solved from F( v )=1). 
The third step we need to reveal v1 is to derive the distribution of the buyer's 
valuation, F(v) and f(v).  Paarsch proposes a method to use the bonus bid (auction 
premium) to empirically estimate the distribution of the buyer's valuation. Paarsch 
defines the bonus bid b, as: 
b = s − r ≥ 0                                   |  (2.21) 
where s is the actual sales price (winning bid) and r is the seller's asking price.  
Obviously, the bonus bid, b, is a variable with a non-negative value. Paarsch has 
proposed a conditional maximum likelihood estimator to estimate the distribution of 
the buyer's valuation based on the number of the actual bidders in the auction.  In 
our study, we follow Paarsch's basic idea to derive the distribution of the auction 
                                                             
12 Note that the integrand 
1
)]([]1)(
)(
[

 p
n
vFvF
dv
vdF
v  is highly non-linear, 
which makes it impossible to directly conduct the integration. Hence, we 
conduct the first-order Taylor expansion to linearize the integrand before we 
do the integration. 
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premium and, thus, an estimate of the winner's true valuation v1.  The exact method 
is presented in a later section of this paper.
13
 
 
5. Empirical Models 
Before presenting our models it is necessary to address a number of empirical 
issues.  First, a common econometric problem in hedonic modeling is that the data 
are related to one another in a spatially heterogeneous manner.  Anselin (1988) uses 
"spatial dependence" or "spatial correlation" to denote the case in which the value 
observed in one location depends on the values at neighboring locations.  The spatial 
correlation problem can be addressed using either a spatial-lag model or spatial-error 
model, the two most common spatial econometric models (each with many variants).  
In our study, we only focus on the Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) and the 
Spatial Error Model (SEM).  The form of the SAR model is, 
y = ρ × W × y + X × β + e                                     \(2.22) 
whereas the functional form of the SEM is given by,  
y = X × β + u, u = λ × W × u + e                              |(2.23) 
In the Eqs. (2.22) and (2.23), X and y are standard explanatory and dependent 
variables. W is referred to as the spatial weight matrix; ρ and λ are the spatial lag 
coefficients in both SAR and SEM, respectively. The disturbance term e is assumed to 
                                                             
13 For more related studies, see Cremer and McLean (1988), Levin and Smith 
(1994), Levin and Smith (1996), and McAfee and Reny (1992). 
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be a Normal distribution, N(0, σ2). 
For the SAR, ρ is a coefficient on the spatially lagged dependent variable, W × y.  
To show the OLS properties of SAR, we transform Eq. (2.22) as follows: 
y = (I - ρ × W)-1 × X × β + (I - ρ × W)-1 × e                       (2.22a) 
Therefore, the OLS estimator for β is, 


 = (XL' × XL)
-1
 × XL' × y                                   ((2.22b) 
where, XL = (I - ρ × W)
-1
 × X.  Substituting Eq. (2.22a) into Eq. (2.22b) and expand 
all the terms, we have: 


 = (XL' × XL)
-1
 × XL' × XL × β + (XL' × XL)
-1
 × XL' × (I - ρ × W)
-1
 × e 
|(2.22c) 
By inspection, from Eq. (2.22c) we have: E[ 

] = β, which means that the OLS 
estimates of β for the SAR is still unbiased.  However, Anselin (1988) has shown 
that the OLS estimate for ρ is biased. To show this, Anselin (1988) proposes a simple 
model, which he calls "The first-order spatial AR model," as follows: 
y = ρ × W × y + e                                          ((2.22d) 
The estimator of ρ is hence, 
ˆ  = (yL' × yL)
-1
 × yL' × y = ρ + (yL' × yL)
-1
 × yL' × e               |(2.22e) 
where yL = W × y.  According to Anselin's explanation, W × y is not fixed in 
repeated sampling (which is the traditional requirement for the explanatory variables), 
since the observations are generated by a spatial process.  Hence, we cannot pass the 
expectation operator over the term (yL' × yL)
-1
 × yL'.  Therefore, we know that E[ ˆ ] 
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≠ ρ, and the estimator of ρ is biased.  In addition, Anselin (1988) also proposes that 
the probability limit (plim) of the term yL' × e, which can be expressed as, 
plim 
n
1
× (yL' × e) = plim 
n
1
× {e' × [(I - ρ × W)-1]' × W' × e}       ((2.22f) 
will not equal zero for all non-trivial case of ρ ≠ 0. Therefore, the estimator of ρ is 
inconsistent. 
A more interesting feature than the inconsistency of ρ is the change of β's 
variance - covariance matrix. By inspection of Eq. (2.22c), we can see that the 
variance - covariance of 

 depends on the term (XL' × XL)
-1
 × XL' × (I - ρ × W)
-1
 × e.  
Thus, we have: 
Var[ 

|X] = σ2 × (XL' × XL)
-1
 × XL' × (I - ρ × W)
-1
 × [(I - ρ × W)-1]' 
× XL × [(XL' × XL)
-1
]'                              (|(2.22g) 
Apparently, only in the trivial case of ρ = 0, can Var[ 

|X] be reduced to σ2 × (X' × 
X)
-1
. Therefore, Var[ 

|X] is not consistent. As a result of this inefficiency issue, the t 
statistics of 

 will be underestimated. 
In regard to the SEM, from Eq. (2.23) the OLS estimator for β is, 


 = (X' × X)
-1
 × X' × y = (X' × X)
-1
 × X' × [X × β + (I - λ × W)-1 × e] 
  = (X' × X)
-1
 × X' × X × β + (X' × X)-1 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e 
  = β + (X' × X)-1 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e                       |(2.23a) 
Since the term (X' × X)
-1
 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e, when taking expectation, would be 
zero, we have: E[ 

] = β, which means that the OLS estimates of β for the SEM is 
still unbiased.  However, the probability limit of the term (X' × X)
-1
 × X' × (I - λ × 
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W)
-1
 × e, 
 plim 
n
1
× {(X' × X)
-1
 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e} 
= plim 
n
1
× [(X' × X)
-1
] × plim 
n
1
× {X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e}         |(2.23b) 
will not equal zero for all non-trivial case of λ ≠ 0. Therefore, the estimator of λ is 
inconsistent. Similar to Eq. (2.22g), we have: 
Var[ 

|X] = σ2 × (X' × X)-1 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × [(I - λ × W)-1]' 
× X × [(X' × X)
-1
]'                                 |(2.23c) 
Again, only in the trivial case of λ = 0, can Var[ 

|X] be reduced to σ2 × (X' × X)-1. 
Therefore, Var[ 

|X] is not consistent, and the t statistics of 

 will be 
underestimated. 
While the generalized method of moments (GMM) is sometimes used to estimate 
spatial models, the most popular way is to use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).  
In our study, we only present the results of MLE for the spatial models. 
When the parcels in a hedonic data set are not contiguous, the spatial weight 
matrix is generally formed with element i, j as the inverse distance between parcels i 
and j (the elements in each row are normalized such that their summation equals one).  
Generally speaking, the combination of spatial techniques with hedonic pricing 
models would increase the R
2
 as well as the significance of estimated coefficients in 
the regression (for example, see Kim et al., 2003). 
Another issue is how to deal with the passage of time.  Our data run from 2004 
through 2009, a time of fluctuating land prices in China.  In our study, we consider 
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three approaches: deflation only by a HPI, use of only monthly time dummy variables, 
as well as a mix of these two approaches.  First, we deflate both the asking price and 
winning bid price by a local monthly housing price index.
14
  Our second approach is 
to include a monthly time trend variable, starting with January 2004 equal to one and 
ending with October 2009 equal to 70.  Our third approach is to use a mix of the 
previous two approaches.  We present and compare the estimation results using each 
of these approaches later in the paper. 
 
5.1. From Auction Premium to the Land Seller's True Valuation 
Traditional hedonic theory posits that the hedonic equilibrium arises from the 
interactions of sellers' offer functions and buyers' bid functions.  Identification 
problems usually prevent one from estimating either the offer function or the bid 
function of market participants.  In our case, though, there is only one supplier in the 
land wholesale market offering land in an English auction; we do not have a set of 
offer curves coming from different sellers.  Thus, the posted asking prices of the 
monopoly supplier for different plots of land can be used to map out the offer curve 
as the characteristics of these plots differ. 
We start our analysis by following Paarsch's (1997) approach and calculate the 
auction premium (or bonus bid), b, the difference between the actual sales price and  
                                                             
14 This housing price index of Chengdu is reported monthly by an authority 
called the National Development and Reform Commission. 
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Fig. 2.6. Empirical Distribution of the Deflated Auction Premium, b 
 
 
 
the asking price. The empirical distribution of deflated b is shown in Fig. 2.6 (where 
the large spike at the left includes both zero and many small non-zero values).  
There one may note that the empirical distribution of the auction premium follows a 
left-censored Normal distribution, suggesting the use of the Tobit model for its 
estimation.  Note that, of our 350 observations of the auction premium, some 57 are 
equal to zero. 
Paarsch's (1997) method begins with the relationship between the sales price s, 
the asking price r, and the bid premium b, as Eq. (2.21) has shown.  We let v be the 
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per unit raw profit of housing development net of expenditure on the land purchase.  
In addition, we assume that H(L) is the quantity of housing arising from parcel 
development, PH is the per unit housing price, and C(L) is the cost of development, 
where L is the quantity of developable land as an input. Then the profit associated 
with the land input is, 
v × L = PH × H(L) − C(L)                             |  (2.24) 
Now we introduce the expenditure for land purchase, so the profit of the 
development, Π, is, 
Π = PH × H(L) − C(L) − s × L = PH × H(L) − C(L) − (r + b) × L      |(2.25) 
Setting Π= Π*, where Π* is the desired profit level, we have: 
b = [PH × H(L) − C(L) − r × L − Π
*
] / L = [v × L − r × L − Π*] / L 
 = v – r − Π*/L                                            ((2.26) 
When Π* = 0, other things equal, b achieves its maximum value, the highest bid the 
developer would make.
15
  If we were to use a Tobit model to parameterize b 
according to b = βX + e, one could use the error distribution to recover the 
distribution of v, which is the true valuation of the land to the developer. 
We do so by noting that e is assumed to be an i.i.d. random variable normally 
distributed as N(0,σ2).  Let βTobit and σTobit be the estimation results from Tobit 
regression of b on the explanatory variables X, so the pdf of e, fe(e), could be denoted 
                                                             
15 Note that Π* ≥ 0. 
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as N(0, σTobit 
2
).
16
  By the inverse function of e, e = b − βTobitX, we can derive the pdf 
of b by the simple probability transformation, fb(b) = fe(b − βTobitX).
17
  Noting that  
b = v − u, we could get the pdf of v by an equivalent probability transformation in a 
similar manner, 
fv(v) = fb(v − u) = fe(v – u − βTobitX)                              |(2.27) 
Once we have the pdf of the buyer's true valuation fv(v), we can obtain the 
corresponding cdf, Fv(v), by integrating fv(v). Then, along with the data of the asking 
price proposed by the seller, we can calculate the seller's true valuation v0 from Eq. 
(2.12).  As soon as we have the information of v0, we can conduct the hedonic 
estimation for the seller.  All models were estimated using OLS, SAR, and SEM 
techniques.  We do not go details of the tests for spatial correlation, but three out of 
five spatial tests suggest that there is strong spatial dependence / correlation for the 
seller's true valuation, and hence we report results from our SEM model.
18,19
 
Our best results—on the basis on expected coefficient signs, the spatial 
correlation tests, and best fit—were obtained with semi-log specification using a  
                                                             
16 The estimation results of the Tobit model are listed in Tables 2.3, 2.4,and 
2.5 for the cases using only HPI deflation, only monthly dummy, and a mix of 
the two, respectively.  Since the Tobit model estimation is just an 
intermediate step in this section, we do not discuss its results in detail. 
17 Note that fb(b) = fe(b − βTobitX) × |de / db|, and de / db = 1. 
18 We used test statistics for Moran's I-test, a likelihood ratio test, a Wald test, 
and a Lagrange multiplier test for spatial correlation in the residuals, and a 
Lagrange multiplier test for correlation in the SAR residuals.  See Anselin 
(1988) and LeSage (1999) for details. 
19 In our study, SEM does a better job than SAR estimation in terms of 
higher t statistic values, R
2
 value, and log-likelihood value, as well as "correct" 
signs of the estimated coefficients which are consistent with our expectation. 
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Table 2.3 
Tobit Estimation of Auction Premium, b (￥/ m2), Using HPI Deflation 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 12369.698 0.811 0.418 
Development Restrictions 
   
Single plot (1=yes) 1498.475 1.555 0.121 
Maximum Plot Ratio  53.184 0.230 0.818 
Maximum Structural Ratio  -4796.245 -1.124 0.262 
Minimum Green Ratio  -43140.535 -5.516 0.000 
Public Amenities and Infrastructure 
  
ln(Subway Station Proximity) 9.755 0.015 0.988 
ln(River Proximity) 189.119 0.545 0.586 
ln(Park Proximity) -758.981 -1.261 0.208 
Hospital Aggregate -316.350 -0.020 0.984 
Road Aggregate 115.937 0.228 0.820 
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables 
Jin Niu  -1136.545 -0.981 0.327 
QingYang -607.044 -0.528 0.598 
Cheng Hua  -1734.941 -1.640 0.102 
Wu Hou -881.698 -0.750 0.454 
Gao Xin South -1294.057 -1.020 0.309 
Gao Xin West -1062.407 -0.388 0.698 
Long Quan -3145.153 -1.637 0.103 
Pi County -2813.957 -1.390 0.166 
Shuang Liu County -2265.588 -1.061 0.289 
Xin Du -1604.958 -0.745 0.457 
Within 1
st
 Ring 1104.739 0.560 0.577 
Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring -788.132 -0.585 0.559 
Between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Ring 309.609 0.296 0.767 
Outside 4
th
 Ring 988.627 0.555 0.579 
Other Variables 
   
Type2Auction (1=yes) -2194.550 -2.760 0.006 
ln(Parcel Size) 576.185 1.762 0.079 
Dependent variable: Deflated Auction Premium 
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Table 2.4 
Tobit Estimation of Auction Premium, b (￥/ m2), Using Monthly Time Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 8252.940 0.766 0.444 
Development Restrictions 
   
Single plot (1=yes) 1972.591 1.677 0.094 
Maximum Plot Ratio  -186.425 -0.630 0.529 
Maximum Structural Ratio  -2083.821 -0.386 0.701 
Minimum Green Ratio  -45830.917 -4.272 0.000 
Public Amenities and Infrastructure 
  
ln(Subway Station Proximity) 155.813 0.267 0.790 
ln(River Proximity) 275.323 0.666 0.506 
ln(Park Proximity) -1044.481 -1.539 0.125 
Hospital Aggregate 2996.909 0.148 0.882 
Road Aggregate 270.746 0.583 0.560 
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables 
Jin Niu  -1719.465 -1.187 0.236 
QingYang -1383.771 -0.920 0.358 
Cheng Hua  -2079.755 -1.504 0.134 
Wu Hou -1674.506 -1.150 0.251 
Gao Xin South -1663.596 -1.009 0.314 
Gao Xin West -2504.278 -0.723 0.470 
Long Quan -2884.502 -1.173 0.242 
Pi County -3417.104 -1.376 0.170 
Shuang Liu County -1704.494 -0.607 0.545 
Xin Du -4662.520 -1.613 0.108 
Within 1
st
 Ring 2235.057 0.878 0.381 
Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring -911.437 -0.546 0.586 
Between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Ring 229.441 0.171 0.864 
Outside 4
th
 Ring 718.931 0.314 0.754 
Other Variables 
   
Type2Auction (1=yes) -2956.123 -2.836 0.005 
ln(Parcel Size) 752.266 1.964 0.050 
Time Trend 75.201 2.982 0.003 
Dependent variable: Auction Premium 
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Table 2.5 
Tobit Estimation of Auction Premium, b (￥/ m2), Using Both HPI Deflation and 
Monthly Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 6568.799 0.798 0.425 
Development Restrictions 
   
Single plot (1=yes) 1550.168 1.744 0.082 
Maximum Plot Ratio  -93.615 -0.419 0.675 
Maximum Structural Ratio  -1436.690 -0.351 0.726 
Minimum Green Ratio  -34189.700 -4.224 0.000 
Public Amenities and Infrastructure 
  
ln(Subway Station Proximity) 103.014 0.232 0.817 
ln(River Proximity) 182.405 0.584 0.560 
ln(Park Proximity) -800.054 -1.562 0.119 
Hospital Aggregate 2137.599 0.140 0.889 
Road Aggregate 211.512 0.601 0.548 
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables 
Jin Niu  -1354.730 -1.238 0.216 
QingYang -1049.460 -0.925 0.356 
Cheng Hua  -1639.060 -1.570 0.117 
Wu Hou -1275.920 -1.161 0.246 
Gao Xin South -1156.830 -0.929 0.353 
Gao Xin West -1833.970 -0.701 0.484 
Long Quan -2239.700 -1.207 0.228 
Pi County -2575.810 -1.373 0.171 
Shuang Liu County -1330.000 -0.627 0.531 
Xin Du -3307.300 -1.517 0.130 
Within 1
st
 Ring 1728.213 0.899 0.369 
Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring -713.114 -0.566 0.572 
Between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Ring 140.318 0.139 0.890 
Outside 4
th
 Ring 516.191 0.299 0.765 
Other Variables 
   
Type2Auction (1=yes) -2376.940 -3.020 0.003 
ln(Parcel Size) 531.855 1.837 0.067 
Time Trend 58.695 3.093 0.002 
Dependent variable: Deflated Auction Premium 
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combination of proximity and aggregate measures for public good amenities and 
infrastructure.  Estimation results are shown in Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 for the three  
cases regarding different time approaches.  The one with HPI deflation (Table 2.6) 
has the smallest R
2
 and log likelihood value. In addition, some of the coefficients' 
signs are not consistent with our expectation.  The models using monthly time 
dummy (Table 2.7) and both deflation and dummy (Table 2.8) have roughly similar 
results. However, since some of the key variables in the mixed case have slightly 
larger t-values, and the value of log likelihood is also larger, we consider the one 
using a mix of deflation and dummy to be the best model specification. 
Using the logarithm of the seller's derived true valuation v0 as the dependent 
variable, we find that the only development restriction that the seller takes into 
account is the maximum Plot Ratio (total floor area relative to parcel size): as the 
maximum Plot Ratio increases its derived true valuation increases.  The seller also 
notes the value of proximity to a planned subway station in that the true valuation 
falls as the plot gets further away.  Another infrastructure measure that affects the 
true valuation is the aggregate measure of hospitals.  That is, as the number of 
hospital beds, inversely weighted by distance to the hospital, increases, the seller's 
true valuation increases.  In addition, seven of the ten district variables were 
statistically significant, indicating that location within the city does affect the seller's 
true valuation for the parcel, and the neighborhood effects exist to some degree.  
Relative to the baseline location between the second and third ring roads, from the  
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Table 2.6 
Spatial Error Model of Seller's Derived True Valuation, v0* (￥/ m
2
), Using HPI 
Deflation 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 8.8149 13.6207 0.000 
Development Restrictions 
   
Single plot (1=yes) -0.0170 -0.24346 0.80764 
Maximum Plot Ratio  0.09246 5.2577 0.000 
Maximum Structural Ratio  -1.1689 -3.6626 0.00025 
Minimum Green Ratio  -2.0975 -3.41086 0.00064 
Public Amenities and Infrastructure 
  
ln(Subway Station Proximity) -0.10238 -2.84222 0.00448 
ln(River Proximity) -0.0111 -0.42128 0.67354 
ln(Park Proximity) 0.03827 0.88762 0.374744 
Hospital Aggregate 3.7053 2.91580 0.00354 
Road Aggregate -0.00088 -0.03019 0.97590 
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables 
Jin Niu  -0.1072 -1.12512 0.26053 
QingYang 0.11064 1.12379 0.2610 
Cheng Hua  -0.1976 -2.2023 0.02763 
Wu Hou 0.16196 1.72759 0.0840 
Gao Xin South -0.0587 -0.53766 0.5908 
Gao Xin West -0.26347 -1.2110 0.225873 
Long Quan -0.8123 -5.2328 0.000 
Pi County -0.73076 -4.4840 0.000 
Shuang Liu County -1.1720 -6.6398 0.000 
Xin Du -0.3698 -2.1356 0.03270 
Within 1
st
 Ring -0.09579 -0.6071 0.5437 
Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring 0.13659 1.32154 0.18632 
Between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Ring -0.0052 -0.06203 0.9505 
Outside 4
th
 Ring 0.06927 0.47382 0.63562 
Other Variables 
   
Type2Auction (1=yes) -0.1124 -1.8569 0.0633 
ln(Parcel Size) 0.05349 2.2721 0.0230 
λ 0.4000 1.7166 0.0860 
Adjusted R-square 0.6732 
sigma^2 0.1492 
log-likelihood -42.97258 
Dependent variable: ln(v0*) 
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Table 2.7 
Spatial Error Model of Seller's Derived True Valuation, v0* (￥/ m
2
), Using 
Monthly Time Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 7.244 13.024 0.000 
Development Restrictions 
   
Single plot (1=yes) 0.009 0.157 0.875 
Maximum Plot Ratio  0.056 3.786 0.000 
Maximum Structural Ratio  -0.322 -1.185 0.236 
Minimum Green Ratio  0.107 0.201 0.841 
Public Amenities and Infrastructure 
  
ln(Subway Station Proximity) -0.075 -2.478 0.013 
ln(River Proximity) -0.009 -0.390 0.697 
ln(Park Proximity) 0.032 0.874 0.382 
Hospital Aggregate 4.505 4.229 0.000 
Road Aggregate 0.023 0.920 0.358 
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables 
Jin Niu  -0.169 -2.059 0.040 
QingYang -0.005 -0.064 0.949 
Cheng Hua  -0.177 -2.314 0.021 
Wu Hou 0.055 0.695 0.487 
Gao Xin South -0.030 -0.323 0.747 
Gao Xin West -0.455 -2.477 0.013 
Long Quan -0.559 -4.192 0.000 
Pi County -0.662 -4.773 0.000 
Shuang Liu County -0.913 -6.130 0.000 
Xin Du -0.851 -5.660 0.000 
Within 1
st
 Ring 0.059 0.444 0.657 
Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring 0.162 1.883 0.060 
Between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Ring -0.045 -0.637 0.524 
Outside 4
th
 Ring -0.066 -0.534 0.593 
Other Variables 
   
Type2Auction (1=yes) -0.168 -3.376 0.001 
ln(Parcel Size) 0.044 2.267 0.023 
Time Trend 0.021 16.339 0.000 
λ 0.592 3.132 0.002 
Adjusted R-square 0.794 
sigma^2 0.101 
log-likelihood 25.000 
Dependent variable: ln(v0*) 
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Table 2.8 
Spatial Error Model of Seller's Derived True Valuation, v0* (￥/ m
2
), Using Both 
HPI Deflation and Monthly Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 7.271 13.490 0.000 
Development Restrictions 
   
Single plot (1=yes) -0.000 -0.002 0.998 
Maximum Plot Ratio  0.053 3.687 0.000 
Maximum Structural Ratio  -0.283 -1.077 0.281 
Minimum Green Ratio  0.161 0.311 0.756 
Public Amenities and Infrastructure 
  
ln(Subway Station Proximity) -0.081 -2.734 0.006 
ln(River Proximity) -0.010 -0.458 0.647 
ln(Park Proximity) 0.032 0.920 0.357 
Hospital Aggregate 4.429 4.292 0.000 
Road Aggregate 0.021 0.877 0.381 
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables 
Jin Niu  -0.162 -2.037 0.042 
QingYang 0.002 0.030 0.976 
Cheng Hua  -0.176 -2.383 0.017 
Wu Hou 0.058 0.745 0.457 
Gao Xin South -0.017 -0.191 0.848 
Gao Xin West -0.448 -2.518 0.012 
Long Quan -0.555 -4.289 0.000 
Pi County -0.661 -4.910 0.000 
Shuang Liu County -0.906 -6.275 0.000 
Xin Du -0.792 -5.434 0.000 
Within 1
st
 Ring 0.047 0.366 0.715 
Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring 0.155 1.858 0.063 
Between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Ring -0.052 -0.759 0.448 
Outside 4
th
 Ring -0.073 -0.603 0.546 
Other Variables 
   
Type2Auction (1=yes) -0.152 -3.160 0.002 
ln(Parcel Size) 0.043 2.312 0.021 
Time Trend 0.016 12.914 0.000 
λ 0.600 3.212 0.001 
Adjusted R-square 0.788 
sigma^2 0.095 
log-likelihood 36.229 
Dependent variable: ln(v0*) 
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seller's perspective only a location between the first and second ring roads has a 
premium associated with it.  In addition, when the government offers land in a Type 
2 auction, its true valuation falls.  As the parcel size increases the seller's true 
valuation increases, too. Even after adjusting for the housing price index, the 
government’s true valuation has tended to increase with time. Finally, the statistical 
significance of λ suggests spatial correlation in the data. 
 
5.2. The Winner's True Valuation 
Having estimated the elements of the government's offer function for developable 
land, it is now time to turn to the buyer's (developer's) side.  As we have noted, the 
winning bid does not necessarily reveal the true valuation held by developer.  
Following the three steps to derive the winner's true valuation v1 as described in 
section 4, we now have all the information we need.  We then use the buyer's 
derived true valuation v1 to estimate the bid function of developers.  Tests for spatial 
correlation show that one of the five spatial tests suggests spatial dependence; we 
therefore use SEM estimation which performs better than SAR estimates. The 
estimation results appear in Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11, for the cases using HPI 
deflation, monthly time dummy, and a mix of the two, respectively.  The model with 
the HPI deflation performs worst, in the sense that it has the smallest R
2
 and 
log-likelihood value, and its estimates of the five environmental and infrastructure 
variables are not statistically significant.  The estimation results of the monthly time 
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dummy variable model and the model with the mix of HPI deflation and the monthly 
dummy are roughly similar. Although the monthly time dummy variable model 
(Table 2.10) has the largest R
2
 value, the t-values are less significant for some of the 
key variables than the mixed model.  Therefore, we choose the model with the mix 
of HPI deflation and the monthly dummy as the best model specification (Table 2.11). 
Using the logarithm of the land buyers' derived true valuation as the dependent 
variable, we find that development restrictions have a greater impact on buyers' 
valuation than those on the government's valuation.  All else equal, developers value 
the land higher if the land parcel is a single plot.  In addition, as the maximum Plot 
Ratio (total floor area relative to parcel size) increases, the buyers' valuations increase.  
As the maximum Structural Ratio (footprint area relative to parcel size) falls, buyers' 
valuations increase.  Also, as the minimum Green Ratio increases, the value of land 
for development falls.  Developers also value public amenities and infrastructure a 
little differently from the government.  In contrast to the government, which appears 
to have to respond to hospital beds and planned subway infrastructure, developers 
place value on hospital beds and existing road infrastructure.  The greater the 
aggregate service levels of healthcare and roads, the greater the value for 
development.  There appears to be a strong correlation between how the government 
values various districts and the developers value land in those districts: of the seven 
negative and significant district variables in the government's offer function, 
developers had similar sign and significance for all seven districts. 
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Table 2.9 
Spatial Error Model of Buyer's Derived True Valuation, v1* (￥/ m
2
), Using HPI 
Deflation 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 9.477 10.698 0.000 
Development Restrictions 
   
Single plot (1=yes) 0.116 1.217 0.224 
Maximum Plot Ratio  0.132 5.497 0.000 
Maximum Structural Ratio  -2.178 -5.013 0.000 
Minimum Green Ratio  -4.854 -5.802 0.000 
Public Amenities and Infrastructure 
ln(Subway Station Proximity) -0.080 -1.613 0.107 
ln(River Proximity) -0.016 -0.441 0.659 
ln(Park Proximity) 0.004 0.071 0.944 
Hospital Aggregate 2.670 1.536 0.125 
Road Aggregate 0.045 1.132 0.257 
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables 
Jin Niu  -0.206 -1.564 0.118 
QingYang 0.068 0.505 0.614 
Cheng Hua  -0.371 -3.008 0.003 
Wu Hou 0.101 0.787 0.431 
Gao Xin South -0.048 -0.318 0.750 
Gao Xin West -0.198 -0.665 0.506 
Long Quan -1.109 -5.195 0.000 
Pi County -0.758 -3.382 0.001 
Shuang Liu County -1.204 -4.984 0.000 
Xin Du -0.663 -2.791 0.005 
Within 1
st
 Ring -0.095 -0.442 0.658 
Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring 0.011 0.080 0.936 
Between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Ring 0.032 0.277 0.782 
Outside 4
th
 Ring 0.062 0.311 0.756 
Other Variables 
   
Type2Auction (1=yes) -0.536 -6.502 0.000 
ln(Parcel Size) 0.058 1.795 0.000 
λ 0.457 2.061 0.039 
Adjusted R-square 0.651 
sigma^2 0.276 
log-likelihood -150.943 
 Dependent Variable: ln(v1*)   
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Table 2.10 
Spatial Error Model of Buyer's Derived True Valuation, v1* (￥/ m
2
), Using 
Monthly Time Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 7.420 9.434 0.000 
Development Restrictions 
   
Single plot (1=yes) 0.146 1.749 0.080 
Maximum Plot Ratio  0.079 3.698 0.000 
Maximum Structural Ratio  -1.084 -2.763 0.006 
Minimum Green Ratio  -1.946 -2.508 0.012 
Public Amenities and Infrastructure 
ln(Subway Station Proximity) -0.040 -0.942 0.346 
ln(River Proximity) -0.012 -0.378 0.705 
ln(Park Proximity) -0.012 -0.227 0.820 
Hospital Aggregate 3.614 2.395 0.017 
Road Aggregate 0.077 2.214 0.027 
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables 
Jin Niu  -0.287 -2.541 0.011 
QingYang -0.096 -0.824 0.410 
Cheng Hua  -0.335 -3.157 0.002 
Wu Hou -0.048 -0.428 0.668 
Gao Xin South -0.014 -0.106 0.915 
Gao Xin West -0.485 -1.874 0.061 
Long Quan -0.811 -4.371 0.000 
Pi County -0.690 -3.576 0.000 
Shuang Liu County -0.892 -4.226 0.000 
Xin Du -1.335 -6.316 0.000 
Within 1
st
 Ring 0.112 0.594 0.553 
Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring 0.046 0.380 0.704 
Between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Ring -0.025 -0.243 0.808 
Outside 4
th
 Ring -0.089 -0.514 0.607 
Other Variables 
   
Type2Auction (1=yes) -0.602 -8.346 0.000 
ln(Parcel Size) 0.046 1.646 0.100 
Time Trend 0.026 14.366 0.000 
λ 0.372 1.562 0.118 
Adjusted R-square 0.752 
sigma^2 0.211 
log-likelihood -103.412 
 Dependent Variable: ln(v1*)   
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Table 2.11 
Spatial Error Model of Buyer's Derived True Valuation, v1* (￥/ m
2
), Using Both 
HPI Deflation and Monthly Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 7.439 9.760 0.000 
Development Restrictions 
   
Single plot (1=yes) 0.150 1.856 0.063 
Maximum Plot Ratio  0.077 3.708 0.000 
Maximum Structural Ratio  -1.025 -2.700 0.007 
Minimum Green Ratio  -1.893 -2.520 0.012 
Public Amenities and Infrastructure 
ln(Subway Station Proximity) -0.044 -1.070 0.285 
ln(River Proximity) -0.015 -0.497 0.619 
ln(Park Proximity) -0.011 -0.222 0.824 
Hospital Aggregate 3.553 2.430 0.015 
Road Aggregate 0.076 2.272 0.023 
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables 
Jin Niu  -0.282 -2.576 0.010 
QingYang -0.089 -0.787 0.431 
Cheng Hua  -0.340 -3.301 0.001 
Wu Hou -0.048 -0.446 0.656 
Gao Xin South 0.002 0.013 0.989 
Gao Xin West -0.477 -1.900 0.057 
Long Quan -0.812 -4.511 0.000 
Pi County -0.693 -3.704 0.000 
Shuang Liu County -0.893 -4.363 0.000 
Xin Du -1.263 -6.164 0.000 
Within 1
st
 Ring 0.114 0.624 0.533 
Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring 0.039 0.331 0.740 
Between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Ring -0.034 -0.346 0.729 
Outside 4
th
 Ring -0.095 -0.562 0.574 
Other Variables 
   
Type2Auction (1=yes) -0.596 -8.527 0.000 
ln(Parcel Size) 0.045 1.678 0.093 
Time Trend 0.021 11.930 0.000 
λ 0.384 1.627 0.104 
Adjusted R-square 0.750 
sigma^2 0.198 
log-likelihood -92.024 
 Dependent Variable: ln(v1*)   
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Developers' true values for land were not significant in the dummy variables of 
ring roads.  In addition, land offered at a Type 2 auction affects the value of land 
significantly in a negative manner, which demonstrates that the longer developers 
consider making a land transaction, the lower the bid.  Finally, developers' 
valuations are found to be positively associated with parcel size, which reveals the 
fact that developers are more willing to pay for larger land parcels for property 
development.  Similar to the model for the government's true valuation, developers' 
valuations for land have increased over time.  Although the spatial correlation 
coefficient λ is only significant at 10.4% level, it shows that spatial correlation in the 
error term exists at least to some degree in the buyer's true valuation. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We have thus far estimated the effect of open space and local public 
infrastructure on the value of urban land in a market that does not satisfy the usual 
assumptions of a competitive market structure, as well as incentive incompatibility 
issues for transaction participants.  Our study shows that when confronting these two 
violations to the traditional assumptions of hedonic theory, we cannot directly apply a 
standard econometric model, due to the monopolistic seller and the incentive 
incompatibility issue in the English auction.  Instead, we take advantage of these 
market features in two ways.  First, the "asking price" of the government seller is 
used to derive its true valuation, so that one can estimate the offer function of the 
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monopoly seller.  On the buyer's side, following Paarsch's (1997) approach, we 
recover the distribution of the buyer's true valuation from a Tobit model estimation 
with respect to the auction premium, and then conduct a three-step approach based on 
Riley and Samuelson's (1981) study to implicitly solve for the winning buyer's true 
valuation through numerical methods.  When we have estimated the true valuation 
of the winning buyers, the explanatory variables account for the buyers' derived true 
valuation fairly well, which allows us to estimate marginal values commonly reported 
in the literature. 
In addition, these two violations to the traditional hedonic theory also generate 
two separate valuations on land with differentiated characteristics.  We find that the 
seller and buyers differ in their marginal valuations of these land characteristics to 
some degree.  While both placing a high value on local infrastructure (such as 
healthcare service level), the local government (i.e., the monopolistic land seller) 
values subway station proximity highly, but land buyers (i.e., the developers) exhibit 
higher values for road service level.  In regard to proximity to subway stations, 
while the government considers it to be a significantly positive factor in determining 
property value, developers do not, perhaps because the subway system in Chengdu is 
still under construction.  In addition, our results show that location relative to a park 
or a river does not matter to either the local government or the developers. 
Regulation requirements for land development matter both to the seller and to the 
buyers. Notably, the maximum requirement for Plot Ratio significantly affects both 
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the land seller and buyers' valuations in a positive manner, which suggests that the 
Plot Ratio is, perhaps, the most important economic regulation requirement on land 
development.  While the maximum Structure Density Ratio and the minimum 
requirement of Green Land Ratio have negative impacts on the land buyers, they do 
not significantly affect the land seller. 
While developers prefer parcels which consist of a single plot, the land seller 
does not.  Locations within the various ring roads are not significant to the 
developers, however, "Between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Ring" has been found significant to the 
land seller's valuation in the sense that the closer to the center of the city, the higher 
the land seller values.  Unobserved neighborhood effects, as measured by district 
variables, have a significant impact on the land valuation for both the land seller and 
buyers. Since our omitted district (Jin Jiang District) includes a large part of the most 
commercialized downtown area in the city, generally speaking, the suburban districts 
are significantly less valued than those in the downtown area.  For all the 
participants, the Type 1 auction tends to increase land valuation, but its impact is 
slightly larger for the developers than for the local government.  Parcel size is also 
found to have a significantly positive impact on land valuation of all participants. 
Our study is valuable to the land seller.  It addresses one of the core issues in 
China's local public financing in that the local governments rely heavily on land sales 
for revenue generation, which is usually referred to as the "land financing."  After 
learning the developer's true valuation on a particular land parcel with given attributes, 
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the local government hence can increase the asking price and therefore generate more 
profit.  In the future study, we can examine the use of alternative methods, such as a 
property tax, to replace the land sales in public financing, while keeping the welfare 
level in the economy stable. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A HEDONIC VALUATION FOR URBAN HOUSING WITH SPATIAL AND 
 
PROJECTS HETEROGENEITY: THE CASE OF CHENGDU, CHINA 
 
Abstract 
This study estimates the effect of spatial heterogeneity, project attributes and 
housing-unit attributes on the value of urban apartment housing using retail sales data 
in a Chinese housing market.  To form the individual spatial weight matrix for each 
of the housing projects, we utilize the three-dimensional distances that not only take 
the plane coordinates into consideration, but also consider the floor on which the 
housing unit is located.  With the aggregate spatial weight matrix transformed from 
the individual spatial weight matrices, we estimate both the spatial autoregressive 
model and the spatial error model using maximum likelihood.  Our results show that 
for project attributes, the Plot Ratio and the weighted aggregate road service level 
have negative impacts on housing price, whereas subway station proximity and park 
proximity, as well as weighted aggregate healthcare service level, have positive 
impacts on housing price.  In regard to housing-unit attributes, our results show that 
the coefficients of both inner and outer view variables are positive, while that of the 
"adjacent to a road" dummy variable is negative.  In addition, our results confirm the 
positive impact of the direction of the major rooms in the housing unit when facing 
south, which is consistent with Chinese culture. 
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1. Introduction 
This study estimates the effects of project attributes and housing-unit attributes 
on housing retail unit sales price.  Our study uses data obtained from a Chinese 
regional housing market which consists of housing units in different housing projects.  
Unlike the "sparse" residential development pattern common in the US and other 
countries, the style of residential development in China is relatively more 
concentrated and denser.  In fact, many large cities in Asia develop in a similar 
manner, and their residential buildings have the "high-rise" shape. Good examples are 
Hong Kong and Singapore.  In the past 20 years, the residential development pattern 
in mainland China has become more and more dense as high-rise residential 
development has expanded from the coastal to the inland region, and is currently the 
prevalent urban development pattern.  In contrast, due to its relatively large 
endowment of land, residential development in the US is much less dense, but some 
large cities such as downtown New York City and Chicago still have many high-rise 
residential buildings.  The high-rise residential pattern presents a challenge to the 
traditional spatial hedonic approach since the standard two-dimensional concept in 
space does not fit the situation well.  To our knowledge, no study has been done to 
conduct the hedonic estimation with respect to the high-rise residential pattern. 
The typical pattern of residential development in China is that a real estate 
developer purchases a land parcel from the local government, and then builds several 
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residential apartment buildings on the parcel.
20
  There could be hundreds to 
thousands of housing units in a single housing project, depending on the size of the 
land parcel as well as the regulation requirement on its development density.  In fact, 
given the large and dense housing projects in China, these projects often play a 
similar role as an entire community in the US.  Large housing projects in China 
usually contain various kinds of open space amenities, sports fields, grocery stores, 
restaurants, and even kindergartens.  Most of these projects are isolated by walls or 
fences, so that only residents and their invited guests can enter the housing projects.  
Housing projects in China, therefore, are analogous to "closed communities" in the 
US. 
For each housing unit within a housing project, we primarily consider two types 
of explanatory variables that could affect its sales price: project attributes and 
housing-unit attributes.
21
  For the first category of attributes, we consider those 
characteristics that could affect all the housing units within a particular housing 
project. Specifically, we examine the development density of the housing project, the 
proximity of the project to the nearest subway station and public park, and the overall 
healthcare service level as well as the service level of urban road network.  For the 
second category of attributes, we consider those characteristics that could affect the 
                                                             
20 In China, all land belongs to the government. The maturity of the 
residential developable land is 70 years. 
21 The housing sales price in China is usually listed in according to ￥/ m2, 
not the total price per unit. 
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individual housing unit within each housing project, e.g., whether the housing unit 
has a view of an open-space amenity either within a housing project or outside the 
project, whether the housing unit is adjacent to a road or street, the unit's floor, the 
direction faced by the major rooms of the housing unit, the area of the housing unit, 
payment method, and the long term trend of the housing price. 
The paper proceeds as follows: first we present a brief review of the traditional 
hedonic theory literature and its extension in a spatial context.  After discussing the 
housing projects in Chengdu, we introduce the Relative Plane Coordinates System, 
and then we present our data.  We then discuss some basic spatial hedonic models 
followed by discussion of the aggregate spatial weight matrix generated by the 
three-dimensional distances, which is a key feature of this study.  Finally, we present 
our estimation results using both spatial autoregressive model and spatial error model 
which are estimated by the maximum likelihood approach. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Hedonic pricing studies date back to the pioneering works of Lancaster (1966), 
Ridker and Henning (1967), among others.  Since the publication of Rosen's (1974) 
theoretical model, hedonic theory has been widely used in valuing the impact of 
environment and infrastructure on property values.  The hedonic approach has been 
used to measure the changes of marginal willingness to pay in environmental 
attributes.  Palmquist (1992) argues that marginal prices can measure total benefits 
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sufficiently when externalities are localized.  In addition, the hedonic approach uses 
data from real market transactions which can control for the hypothetical bias 
commonly found in the stated preference methods.  The original hedonic approaches 
were used to value air quality; others looked at school quality, open space, mosquito 
abatement, road conditions, etc.  In this research, we are primarily interested in how 
certain local public goods (i.e., open space and local infrastructure) and housing-unit 
attributes influence the housing price. 
Open space is broadly defined as parks, rivers, or undeveloped land.  In this 
study, our primary interest is public parks located within the main urban area of a city 
(see for example, Bolitzer and Netusil, 2000).  While most studies consider the 
distance from a property to the source of open space, which is normally referred to as 
proximity, others have combined a measure of proximity with a measure of size, such 
as the area of a park (see Bolitzer and Netusil, 2000, and Mahan et al., 2000, for 
examples).
22
  Other studies have also used a simple dummy variable to identify 
nearby open space amenities (see for example, Asabere and Huffman, 2009).  In this 
study, we use a combination of these three approaches where applicable. 
Gibbons and Machin (2003) and Nelson (1982) are good examples of studies 
examining the impact of a transportation system on property value.  Gibbons and 
Machin (2003) use a method based on property values to evaluate the economic 
                                                             
22 While most distances are measured from centroid to centroid, there are a 
few studies that measure the distance from centroid to edge (see for Mahan et 
al., 2000, and Shultz and King, 2001). 
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benefits of transport access and transport innovation. They point out two benefits 
associated with the accessibility of rail: one is saving on travel times, and the other is 
the changes of the distribution of job types and wages.  Essentially, easy access to a 
rail system can reduce the commuting costs to a great enough extent that potentially 
more-productive and higher-paid city jobs can be accessed.  They define two ways 
to access a rail system: one is related to the distance to a station, and the other is the 
service frequency at the nearest station.  They find proximity to a railway station and 
increased frequency positively affect property values.  In addition, Nelson (1982) 
reviews nine studies on the effect of highway noise, finding that highway noise would 
cause a belt of roughly 1,000 feet that could negatively affect the nearby property 
value. 
In addition to open space amenities and local infrastructure, property values are 
also regressed on various structural characteristics of the housing units, such as area 
of the unit, number of bedrooms, etc. (see for example, Lutzenhiser and Netusil, 2001 
and Provencher et al., 2008).  A variable capturing the "view" is commonly called 
"View variable."  Sander and Polasky (2009) define the "View variable" in the 
following manner: viewshed area in square meters, standard deviation of elevations in 
a viewshed (measure of relief), view richness calculated as percentage of possible 
land use and land cover types contained in a viewshed, a viewshed composed of 
forest, a viewshed composed of grassy land covers, a viewshed composed of water, 
and a dummy variable indicating if a property has a view of downtown.  Their 
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results show that proximity to lakes has the greatest impact on home sale value. In 
addition, they find that view areal extents and the amount of water and grassy land 
covered in views also have positive impact on sale prices. 
 
3. Market Setting and Data 
3.1. The City of Chengdu and the Housing Projects 
Our data set consists of six housing projects in Chengdu, China.
23
  We have 
1,268 observations (housing units) contained in six different housing projects (211 
housing units per project on average).  The city of Chengdu is the capital of Sichuan 
Province, which lies in the southwestern part of mainland China, about 1500 
kilometers southwest of Beijing.  It is situated at the western edge of the Sichuan 
Basin, with nearly 13 million official residents.  Chengdu has the shape of a standard 
monocentric city.  The most urbanized part of the city is surrounded by four 
concentric ring roads, with a fifth ring road under construction.  Besides the ring 
roads, many radius roads also connect the center of the city to its edge in all 
directions.  Currently, there are two subway lines being constructed from the north 
to the south, and from the west to the east, across the city.  Our six housing projects 
are scattered across the city. Four housing projects are either within or around the 
third ring road, whereas the other two are further from the center of the city (see Fig.  
                                                             
23 We obtain sales data in the housing retail market from a local real estate 
sales agency, Chengdu SAGA Organization Ltd. 
73 
 
Fig. 3.1. Location of the Housing Projects 
 
 
 
3.1 for the location of the housing projects). 
 
3.2. Relative Plane Coordinates System 
Unlike those commonly seen in the related literature, the information we have 
does not allow us to geo-code the housing units in each of the six housing projects 
using the GPS coordinates, because we do not have access to an up-to-date satellite 
image.   In the absence of a GPS coordinate system (see for example, Anderson and 
West, 2006, and Bolitzer and Netusil, 2000), some researchers use a "grid" to 
geo-code the observations (see for Mahan et al., 2000).  Since the housing units in 
the US commonly situate in a relatively sparse manner from one to another, the "grid" 
74 
method of geo-coding works fairly well.  In our case, however, housing units within 
one housing project are very dense, thus if we simply use a city-wide "grid" to 
geo-code these housing units we stand to lose a great deal of accuracy.
24
 
In this study, we rely upon a "Relative Plane Coordinates System."  There are 
two steps to implement this approach: first, we construct relative plane coordinates 
for each housing project; second, we calculate the length of the unit scale of each of 
the relative coordinates in meters.  We have obtained the site plan of the housing 
projects from the local real estate sales agency along with the sales data.  The sales 
agency has also assisted us with marking the room numbers of the housing units on 
the site plan.  With this information we are able to use a simple but efficient way to 
geo-code the housing units. 
Many graphic editing software programs have an auxiliary function called "ruler" 
which helps graphic designers locate elements in the graph more accurately.  In our 
case, we use this ruler function to geo-code the housing units. The graphic software 
used is Photoshop.
25
  One example is shown in Fig. 3.2. When we apply the ruler 
function, the software generates two rulers on both the top and left edges of the graph 
(the site plan in our case).  These two rulers can play the role of a coordinates 
system.
26
  After re-scaling the ruler distances, the distance between any two points  
                                                             
24 Some large housing projects may include 3,000 - 4,000 housing units, or 
more. 
25 Researchers could use any other graphic software that has a "ruler" 
function. 
26 Note that the origin generated by the software lies on the top-left corner, 
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Fig. 3.2. An Example of the Site Plan of the Housing Project with "Ruler" 
 
 
in the plane is measured in meters.
27
 
                                                                                                                                                               
but we still have coordinates in a (x,y) pattern. To differentiate this system 
from one with height that we will discuss later, we add a term "plane" to it.  
This is why we call it "Relative Plane Coordinates System." 
27 With this relative system that is not directly comparable for different 
housing projects, the scale changes due to the differentiated size of the graph. 
It is therefore necessary to transform each distance in different housing 
projects to a common scale (meters).  We are able to accurately measure the 
distance of a given section along the edge in meters, EDGEi, for i=1,2,...,6 
denoting the 6 housing projects.  Then, we turn to the site plan and find the 
corresponding two points along the edge of the site plan.  Using the 
corresponding coordinates of these two points in our relative system, we 
calculate the distance between these two points under the relative plane 
coordinates system, denoted by DISTi, for 
 
Open space 
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project 
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Housing project 
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buildings 
Open space 
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3.3. Data Description 
We divide the variables in our data set into three categories: Project-Attribute 
Variables, Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables, and Other Variables.  For 
Project-Attribute Variables, we consider five variables: Plot Ratio, Subway Station 
Proximity, Park Proximity, Hospital Aggregate, and Road Aggregate.  Plot Ratio is 
the ratio of total floor area to the land parcel area, which is the major index of 
development density.  With respect to local infrastructure, we consider subway 
station proximity, healthcare service level (i.e., public hospitals), and major urban 
road network service level.  Whether to use "proximity" or "level" is not only an 
empirical issue, but also a practical issue in the sense that we need to select those 
variables which are consistent with common sense. 
For example, intuitively a measure of the distance to the nearest subway station 
would seem a more appropriate measure than a count of how many subway stations 
are surrounding a property.  Subway Station Proximity, therefore, measures the 
Haversine distance from the centroid of each housing project to the nearest subway 
station.
28
  Park Proximity measures the distance to the nearest public park in a 
                                                                                                                                                               
i = 1,2,...,6.  We then calculate the unit scale of the relative plane coordinates 
system, SCALEi, simply by: SCALEi = EDGEi / DISTi, for i = 1,2,...,6.                                     
With this unit scale we can transform (standardize) each distance calculated in 
the relative plane coordinates system into meters by a simple multiplication, 
which is then comparable among different housing projects across the city. 
28 The Haversine formula calculates the distance between any two points on 
a sphere.  Haversine distance is usually obtained in the following steps: R = 
earth's radius (mean= 6,371km), Δlat = lat2 − lat1, Δlong = long2 − long1, a = 
sin²(Δlat/2) + cos(lat1) × cos(lat2) × sin²(Δlong/2), c = 2 × 
arcsin{min[1,sqrt(a)]}, d = R × c.  Note that all angles are measured in 
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similar manner.  Hospital Aggregate measures the weighted aggregate healthcare 
service level evaluated at the centroid of each housing project. We use the number of 
beds in one hospital as its service level, and the reciprocal of the Haversine distance 
between the hospital to the target housing project as its "weight."
29
 Thus, our 
aggregate measure of K public hospitals associated with a housing project located at 
latitude u and longitude v is,  
a(u,v) =       k/zk                                           ((3.1) 
where a(u,v) measures the service level of public hospital in aggregate, ak is the 
number of beds in the k
th
 hospital, and zk is the distance from the housing project to 
the k
th
 hospital.  In addition, Road Aggregate is calculated in a similar manner.  We 
depict the major road network in the city by 70,826 points with the GPS coordinates 
(see Fig. 3.1). We assign a unit "1" to all the road location points as their "level," and 
follow exactly the same approach as that for the hospitals to calculate the weighted 
aggregate road service level.  The descriptive statistics of all the five variables in the 
category of Project attributes are reported in Table 3.1. 
Sander and Polasky (2009) calculate viewsheds using the VIEWSHED function in 
a software called ArcGIS.  Unfortunately, we do not have access to local GIS 
database that could satisfy the requirement of the VIEWSHED function in ArcGIS.  
We therefore only use the dummy variable approach to represent the "View variables"  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
radians. 
29 We consider all the public hospitals in the city. 
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Project Attributes 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Plot Ratio 4.354 4.380 2.723 
Subway Station Proximity (m) 5903.838 3215.304 5535.142 
Park Proximity (m) 1348.407 1305.554 484.032 
Hospital Aggregate 0.082 0.065 0.040 
Road Aggregate 8.132 7.466 2.695 
 
 
 
in this study.  In addition, due to the distinct feature of the Chinese culture, we also 
introduce the "Direction variables," which could be considered as special variants of 
the standard "View Variables."  In regard to the Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables in 
this study, the first thing we need to consider is the "View" of the housing units to 
either the major open-space amenity source within each housing project or 
open-space amenity source that is outside but adjacent to the housing project. 
As the site plan in Fig. 3.2 shows, the major open-space amenity sources within 
this small housing project are the swimming pool and some small gardens nearby, 
which lie in the center of the project surrounded by the residential buildings.  We 
assign a value "1" to those housing units that are able to see the swimming pool.  In 
addition, to the north of this housing project, a small public park (the green land as 
shown in the site plan) is an open-space amenity source outside but adjacent to this 
housing project. Again, for those housing units that have a view of this public park, 
we assign a value "1." 
In addition to these two "amenity" view variables, we also introduce a 
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"disamenity" dummy variable to show whether a housing unit is close to the urban 
road / street.  Living close to a major urban road (especially directly facing it), 
residents would suffer from noise and dust. We therefore expect a negative sign for 
the coefficient on this dummy variable.  Note that these three "view" variables are 
not mutually exclusive.
30
 Thus, we include each of these three variables in our 
estimation.  In our data set, 39.2% of the housing units have view to major inner 
open space amenities, 23.1% of the housing units have view to open space amenities 
right outside the housing projects, and 31.9% of the housing units are located on the 
fringe of the housing projects which are close to urban roads and streets. 
In the Chinese culture, people pay attention to the direction of the major rooms 
(such as living room, main bedroom, etc.) when they choose the location of their 
housing units.  Facing south is considered to be the most preferable direction for 
living, which is believed to make the room cool in summer and warm in winter.  We 
therefore use eight dummy variables to depict the direction of the housing units.  In 
our data set, 14% of the housing units have their major rooms facing directly to the 
South (see Table 3.2).  Since the dummy variables of these eight directions are 
mutually exclusive, we omit "Northwest," which has the most observations in the data 
set. 
Other variables in the category of housing unit attributes include "Floor," "Unit  
                                                             
30 In fact, 14.8% of the observations in our data set have two of these three 
attributes at the same time; 6.3% of the observations have all the three 
attributes. 
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Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Housing-Unit Attributes and Dependent 
Variables 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Floor 10.625 9.000 7.540 
Unit area (m
2
) 95.125 89.370 31.965 
Distance to major open-space amenity 
within each project (m) 
176.843 97.761 229.999 
Time trend (1= Jan, 2004) 61.217 62.000 6.9703 
    
Inner view (1=yes) 39.236% -- 0.493 
Outer view (1=yes) 23.090% -- 0.445 
Close to street (1=yes) 31.858% -- 0.478 
    
North (1=yes) 13% -- 0.319 
North East (1=yes) 7% -- 0.246 
East (1=yes) 11% -- 0.300 
South East (1=yes) 17% -- 0.386 
South (1=yes) 14% -- 0.337 
South West (1=yes) 13% -- 0.330 
West (1=yes) 5% -- 0.204 
North West (1=yes) 20% -- 0.427 
    
Deflated unit sales price (￥/ m2) 4130.603 4256.436 1256.344 
Non-deflated unit sales price (￥/ m2) 5551.158 5685.0858 1658.371 
 
 
 
area," and "Distance to major open-space amenity within each project."  "Floor," 
which shows the number of stories at which the housing unit situates, in fact gives the 
height of the housing unit.  "Unit area" is not only a quantitative index, but also a 
qualitative index.  Normally in the market, the larger the area of the housing unit, the 
more luxurious it is considered to be. Thus, by treating "Unit area" as a characteristic 
of the housing unit, we expect a positive sign for its coefficient. "Distance to major 
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open-space amenity within each project" is a key explanatory variable in this study.  
Using our relative plane coordinates system, we obtain the coordinates for each of the 
housing units, along with the coordinates of the centroid of the open-space amenity 
source within each housing project.  With these coordinates, we could calculate the 
Euclidian distance from each housing unit to the source of the in-project open space.  
Note that these distances are two dimensional, so that the distance from a housing 
unit at the top of a building to the open space source would be the same as that at the 
bottom of the building. 
Besides the variables in these two categories, we consider two additional other 
variables: payment method and time trend.  The first shows the choice of payment 
method.  Normally in China, when consumers purchase housing with cash, not a 
mortgage, they receive some discount from the developer. Therefore, we would 
expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this variable.  In our data set, 73.5% of 
the housing units are purchased via mortgage. 
Sales for the entire housing project usually takes a long period of time,
31
 and the 
6 housing projects in our data set were not marketed during the same time period, 
thus we need to consider the issue of time in our study.  Common approaches to deal 
with the time issue are: deflation by a given price index,
32
 such as housing price 
                                                             
31 In China, the developers usually sell housing units in "batches," thus it 
may take several years for large housing projects to complete their 
development and sales. 
32 See for example, Bolitzer and Netusil (2000) and Lutzenhiser and Netusil 
(2001). 
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index (HPI), as well as the use of certain time dummy variables.
33
  In this study, we 
also consider a use of a mix of deflation by HPI and a time dummy.  The choice of 
these three approaches is just an empirical issue, therefore, we use all of them in our 
study.  We set January 2004 to be 1, and use a step size of 1 for every additional 
month.
34
  
Against each explanatory variable that discussed above, we set the variable of 
"Deflated unit sales price" as our dependant variable.
35
 We use a local monthly 
housing price index (HPI) to deflate the short term fluctuation in the actual housing 
sales price.
36
  We set the value of the HPI to be 1 in January 2004, and then divide 
the actual sales price by the corresponding value of HPI. Descriptive statistics of all 
the variables in the second and the third categories along with the dependent variables 
are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
4. Empirical Models 
4.1. Spatial Hedonic Models 
Rosen's (1974) seminal article proposed an equilibrium model of product 
                                                             
33 See for example, Provencher et al. (2008). The annual dummy variables 
are included to represent the temporal shifts in the residential property market. 
34 Note that, for the "deflation only" case, we do not include the monthly 
dummy variables. 
35 Note that, for the case of "dummy only," we do not use the deflated unit 
sales prices as the dependent variable. Instead, we directly use the 
non-deflated sales price. 
36 The housing price index in Chengdu is reported monthly by the National 
Development and Reform Commission. 
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differentiation. In a competitive market, goods are valued for their utility-bearing 
characteristics, and the interactions of buyers and sellers over multiple attributes yield 
the hedonic equilibrium price function.  On the supply side, a set of sellers propose 
several price schemes over the vector of characteristics z, known as the "offer curve," 
ϕ(z).  On the demand side, many buyers also propose a set of valuation on z, known 
as the "bid curve," θ(z).  The price function P(z) is hence an envelope of the tangent 
points between the offer and bid functions, as Fig. 3.3 shows. 
Since the housing retail market in our study can be considered competitive, 
traditional hedonic theory applies.  However, a commonly seen econometric 
problem in hedonic modeling is that the data may be spatially correlated.  Anselin 
(1988) has shown that OLS estimates are inconsistent under spatial heterogeneity.  A 
quick examination of our data confirms strong spatial correlation.
37
  Although there 
are several variants, Anselin (1988) has discussed the two fundamental spatial 
econometric models that address the spatial correlation problem — the spatial-lag 
(SAR) and spatial-error (SEM) models.  The functional form of the SAR is, 
y = ρ × W × y + X × β + e                         |(3.2) 
whereas the form of the SEM is given by,  
y = X × β + u, u = λ × W × u + e                     ((3.3) 
                                                             
37 We used test statistics for Moran's I-test, a likelihood ratio test, a Wald test, 
and a Lagrange multiplier test for spatial correlation in the residuals, and a 
Lagrange multiplier test for correlation in the SAR residuals.  See Anselin 
(1988) and LeSage (1999) for details.  All five tests show strong spatial 
correlation in the housing unit sales price. 
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Fig. 3.3. Hedonic Price Function in the Housing Retail Market 
 
 
 
The most important features of these models in Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3), are W, ρ, and 
λ, where W is known as the spatial weight matrix, ρ and λ are the spatial lag 
coefficients in both SAR and SEM, respectively.  The maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) approach is the most popular estimation method for the spatial 
models.  As Kim et al. (2003) have shown, spatial techniques in hedonic pricing 
models usually increase both the R
2
 and the significance of estimated coefficients.  
Further discussion of spatial hedonic models can be found in Irwin (2002) and others. 
 
4.2. Spatial Weight Matrix 
There are two difficulties in forming the spatial weight matrix in our study.  
First, as normally seen in literature, the spatial weight matrix is constructed in a plane, 
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two-dimensional surface.  However, a 2-D spatial weight matrix does not apply to 
our data.
38
  Since the high-rise residential buildings in our data set have multistories, 
it is possible that the sales price of two housing units with similar characteristics but 
different height are spatially correlated.  However, in a 2-D setting, the distance 
between these two units would be zero, which fails to capture the spatial nature in 
height.  Therefore, we need to extend the traditional 2-D spatial weight matrix into a 
three-dimensional (3-D) setting. 
Before we formally construct our spatial weight matrix, we need to introduce the 
three-dimensional distance.  As Fig. 3.4 shows, the 3-D distance in a (x,y,z) 
coordinates system is given by line BC, rather than line OB as the 2-D distance in a 
(x,y) coordinates system. The 3-D distance BC, therefore, is given as follows:
39
 
BC = [(OA
2
 + AB
2
)
1/2
 + OC
2
]
1/2
                                 |(3.4) 
Once we have obtained the 3-D distances, we follow the standard approach to form 
the spatial weight matrix for each of the six housing projects, i.e., use the reciprocal 
of the 3-D distances as the elements of the spatial weight matrix.  We denote these 
six spatial weight matrices by W1,W2,...,W6. 
The second difficulty is how to form an "aggregate" spatial weight matrix.  
Since our relative coordinates system described previously is not a global coordinates  
                                                             
38 In fact, in our preliminary estimation, the 2-D spatial weight matrix has 
done a very poor job. The matrix is nearly singular and cannot be inverted. 
39 In the local market, the height of each floor is commonly 3 meters, we 
therefore calculate the height of the housing unit, OC, approximately by: 
OC = 3 × (Floor - 1). 
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Fig. 3.4. Three-Dimensional Distance 
 
 
 
system such as GPS, a project-specific spatial weight is not directly comparable to 
that of another project.  Each weight matrix is valid only within the limit of the 
individual housing project.  However, we could use two approaches to depict the 
relationship of the housing units among different housing projects.  Perhaps the 
easiest and most straight forward way is to consider the impact of the housing units in 
one housing project on housing units in other housing projects to be zero.  While the 
distances between different housing units within a housing project are small (usually 
measured in meters), the distances between different housing projects are very large 
(usually measured in kilometers).  We could therefore let the reciprocal of the 
distances of the housing units at different housing projects equal to zero. Paying 
attention to the dimensions of the elements, we could construct the "aggregate" 
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spatial weight matrix as follows: 
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where O is zero matrix, and n1,n2,...,n6 stand for the number of observations in each 
housing project.  An alternative method of forming the aggregate spatial weight 
matrix is to use the reciprocal of the distances among different housing projects (as 
measured from centroid to centroid) as the off-diagonal elements.  Specifically, we 
would construct the "aggregate" spatial weight matrix in the following manner: 
W = 
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                                                           (3.6) 
where dij is the distance from housing project i to housing project j, for i,j=1,2,...,6; 
I(ni,nj) is the identity matrix. 
Once we have decided upon a spatial weight matrix, we can implement spatial 
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econometric techniques.  We first use the aggregate spatial weight matrix defined in 
Eq. (3.5), and then try the one defined in Eq. (3.6).  For both matrices, we estimate 
both the SAR and the SEM.  The estimation results for the SAR are reported in 
Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, for the cases using HPI deflation, monthly time dummy, and 
both deflation and dummy, respectively.  In addition, the results of SEM are reported 
in Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8.  The results using the aggregate spatial matrix defined in 
Eq. (3.6) are similar to those using the one defined in Eq. (3.5), thus we only present 
the results using the simpler aggregate spatial weight matrix defined in Eq. (3.5) 
here.
40
 
 
4.3. Estimation Results 
Overall, SEM appears to perform better than SAR, in the sense that several key 
explanatory variables are more statistically significant even though their signs are 
roughly the same. The adjusted R
2
 of the SEM models are larger than the SAR 
models as well.  Among the three SEM models, the one with only a monthly time 
dummy (Table 3.7) appears to have the largest R
2
, however, the sign of "Park 
proximity" is not as expected, since a positive sign means that the further away from 
the park the higher of the housing price, which is inconsistent with our common sense. 
For the cases using HPI deflation (Table 3.6) and the one with both deflation and  
 
                                                             
40 Estimation results using the aggregate spatial weight matrix defined in Eq. 
(3.6) are available upon request. 
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Table 3.3 
Spatial Autoregressive Model of Deflated Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m
2
), Using HPI 
Deflation 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 1.1505 1.2566 0.2089 
Project-Attribute Variables 
   
Plot Ratio  -0.0539 -1.2772 0.2015 
ln(Subway station proximity) -0.0825 -1.2554 0.2093 
ln(Park proximity) -0.0010 -0.1242 0.9012 
Hospital aggregate 5.2838 1.4339 0.1516 
Road aggregate -0.0678 -1.4123 0.1578 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables 
Floor  0.0001 0.4861 0.6269 
Inner view (1=yes) 0.0370 9.4551 0.0000 
Outer view (1=yes)  0.0232 4.7904 0.0003 
Close to street (1=yes) -0.0050 -1.1702 0.2419 
North (1=yes) -0.0119 -1.9070 0.0565 
North East (1=yes) -0.0037 -0.5106 0.6096 
East (1=yes) -0.0185 -2.7652 0.0057 
South East (1=yes) -0.0043 -0.9329 0.3509 
South (1=yes) 0.0494 7.9155 0.0000 
South West (1=yes) 0.0007 0.1132 0.9098 
West (1=yes) -0.0005 -0.0595 0.9526 
Distance to inner source -0.0001 -1.4480 0.1476 
Housing unit area 0.0004 6.3184 0.0000 
Other Variables 
   
Pay in cash (1=yes) -0.0140 -4.2672 0.0000 
    
ρ 0.9790 126.2010 0.0000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.9335 
sigma^2 0.0023 
log-likelihood 2466.5871 
Dependent variable: ln(Deflated housing unit price) 
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Table 3.4 
Spatial Autoregressive Model of Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m
2
), Using Monthly 
Time Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 1.1929 1.2704 0.2039 
Project-Attribute Variables 
   
Plot Ratio  -0.0553 -1.2772 0.2015 
ln(Subway station proximity) -0.0850 -1.2622 0.2069 
ln(Park proximity) -0.0014 -0.1232 0.9020 
Hospital aggregate 5.4235 1.4437 0.1488 
Road aggregate -0.0670 -1.4320 0.1521 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables 
Floor  0.0002 0.8121 0.4167 
Inner view (1=yes) 0.0372 9.3948 0.0000 
Outer view (1=yes)  0.0238 4.8756 0.0000 
Close to street (1=yes) -0.0049 -1.1374 0.2554 
North (1=yes) -0.0122 -1.9305 0.0536 
North East (1=yes) -0.0054 -0.7324 0.4639 
East (1=yes) -0.0170 -2.9451 0.0032 
South East (1=yes) -0.0059 -1.2650 0.2059 
South (1=yes) 0.0484 7.6454 0.0000 
South West (1=yes) 0.0000 0.0065 0.9948 
West (1=yes) -0.0006 -0.0674 0.9463 
Distance to inner source -0.0001 -1.4880 0.1368 
Housing unit area 0.0004 6.1894 0.0000 
Other Variables 
   
Pay in cash (1=yes) -0.0135 -4.0578 0.0001 
Time trend -0.0000 -0.0243 0.9806 
ρ 0.9790 124.7119 0.0000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.9321 
sigma^2 0.0024 
log-likelihood 2453.2726 
Dependent variable: ln(Housing unit price) 
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Table 3.5 
Spatial Autoregressive Model of Deflated Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m
2
), Using 
Both HPI Deflation and Monthly Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 1.2697 1.4208 0.1554 
Project-Attribute Variables 
   
Plot Ratio  -0.0551 -1.3575 0.1746 
ln(Subway station proximity) -0.0858 -1.3569 0.1748 
ln(Park proximity) -0.0008 -0.0671 0.9465 
Hospital aggregate 5.3425 1.5204 0.1284 
Road aggregate -0.0679 -1.4918 0.1358 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables 
Floor  0.0001 0.5004 0.6168 
Inner view (1=yes) 0.0371 9.4538 0.0000 
Outer view (1=yes)  0.0233 4.8107 0.0000 
Close to street (1=yes) -0.0051 -1.2011 0.2297 
North (1=yes) -0.0119 -1.9048 0.0568 
North East (1=yes) -0.0037 -0.5023 0.6155 
East (1=yes) -0.0186 -2.7728 0.0056 
South East (1=yes) -0.0043 -0.9227 0.3561 
South (1=yes) 0.0496 7.9120 0.0000 
South West (1=yes) 0.0008 0.1298 0.8967 
West (1=yes) -0.0004 -0.0436 0.9652 
Distance to inner source -0.0001 -1.5345 0.1249 
Housing unit area 0.0005 6.4325 0.0000 
Other Variables 
   
Pay in cash (1=yes) -0.0140 -4.2615 0.0000 
Time trend -0.0000 -0.0806 0.9358 
ρ 0.9680 104.2122 0.0000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.9509 
sigma^2 0.0023 
log-likelihood 2463.8601 
Dependent variable: ln(Deflated housing unit price) 
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Table 3.6 
Spatial Error Model of Deflated Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m
2
), Using HPI 
Deflation 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 14.4969 52.9346 0.0000 
Project-Attribute Variables 
   
Plot Ratio  -0.3005 -4.7624 0.0001 
ln(Subway station proximity) -0.5952 -6.5643 0.0000 
ln(Park proximity) -0.0116 -0.1106 0.9119 
Hospital aggregate 21.4001 3.5758 0.0003 
Road aggregate -0.2268 -3.3759 0.0007 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables 
Floor  -0.0002 -0.5301 0.5961 
Inner view (1=yes) 0.0433 9.0134 0.0000 
Outer view (1=yes)  0.0229 3.5878 0.0003 
Close to street (1=yes) -0.0132 -2.4402 0.0147 
North (1=yes) -0.0165 -2.0895 0.0367 
North East (1=yes) -0.0145 -1.4672 0.1423 
East (1=yes) -0.0188 -2.2634 0.0236 
South East (1=yes) -0.0065 -1.1253 0.2604 
South (1=yes) 0.0561 6.8528 0.0000 
South West (1=yes) 0.0001 0.0156 0.9876 
West (1=yes) 0.0053 0.5160 0.6058 
Distance to inner source -0.0003 -2.6386 0.0083 
Housing unit area 0.0009 7.8160 0.0000 
Other Variables 
   
Pay in cash (1=yes) -0.0144 -4.1225 0.0000 
    
λ 0.9660 899.8973 0.0000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.9736 
sigma^2 0.0023 
log-likelihood 2464.2008 
Dependent variable: ln(Deflated housing unit price) 
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Table 3.7 
Spatial Error Model of Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m
2
), Using Monthly Time Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 14.5140 42.5045 0.0000 
Project-Attribute Variables 
   
Plot Ratio  -0.2808 -3.5207 0.0004 
ln(Subway station proximity) -0.5922 -5.1690 0.0000 
ln(Park proximity) 0.0143 0.1076 0.9144 
Hospital aggregate 19.2306 2.5450 0.0109 
Road aggregate -0.2085 -2.4660 0.0137 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables 
Floor  -0.0001 -0.2433 0.8078 
Inner view (1=yes) 0.0433 8.9128 0.0000 
Outer view (1=yes)  0.0237 3.6710 0.0002 
Close to street (1=yes) -0.0132 -2.4085 0.0160 
North (1=yes) -0.0170 -2.1199 0.0340 
North East (1=yes) -0.0176 -1.7576 0.0788 
East (1=yes) -0.0205 -2.4467 0.0144 
South East (1=yes) -0.0086 -1.4736 0.1406 
South (1=yes) 0.0544 6.5593 0.0000 
South West (1=yes) -0.0014 -0.1687 0.8661 
West (1=yes) 0.0050 0.4847 0.6277 
Distance to inner source -0.0003 -2.5637 0.0104 
Housing unit area 0.0009 7.6168 0.0000 
Other Variables 
   
Pay in cash (1=yes) -0.0138 -3.9076 0.0001 
Time trend 0.0002 0.2483 0.8039 
λ 0.9730 1012.4403 0.0000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.9748 
sigma^2 0.0024 
log-likelihood 2452.8514 
Dependent variable: ln(Housing unit price) 
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Table 3.8 
Spatial Error Model of Deflated Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m
2
), Using Both HPI 
Deflation and Monthly Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 14.4433 43.3222 0.0000 
Project-Attribute Variables 
   
Plot Ratio  -0.2978 -3.8959 0.0001 
ln(Subway station proximity) -0.5934 -5.3998 0.0000 
ln(Park proximity) -0.0070 -0.0550 0.9562 
Hospital aggregate 21.0537 2.9093 0.0036 
Road aggregate -0.2245 -2.7688 0.0056 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables 
Floor  -0.0002 -0.5404 0.5889 
Inner view (1=yes) 0.0432 9.0004 0.0000 
Outer view (1=yes)  0.0228 3.5683 0.0004 
Close to street (1=yes) -0.0131 -2.4203 0.0155 
North (1=yes) -0.0164 -2.0726 0.0382 
North East (1=yes) -0.0147 -1.4784 0.1393 
East (1=yes) -0.0187 -2.2542 0.0242 
South East (1=yes) -0.0065 -1.1295 0.2587 
South (1=yes) 0.0560 6.8248 0.0000 
South West (1=yes) 0.0001 0.0070 0.9944 
West (1=yes) 0.0052 0.5085 0.6111 
Distance to inner source -0.0003 -2.5423 0.0110 
Housing unit area 0.0009 7.7069 0.0000 
Other Variables 
   
Pay in cash (1=yes) -0.0144 -4.1220 0.0000 
Time trend 0.0001 0.1681 0.8665 
λ 0.9720 995.0180 0.0000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.9737 
sigma^2 0.0023 
log-likelihood 2465.9607 
Dependent variable: ln(Deflated housing unit price) 
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dummy (Table 3.8), the results appear to be roughly the same.  Since the one using 
both deflation and dummy has slightly larger R
2
 and log likelihood values, we 
consider the SEM using a mix of deflation and dummy to be the preferable estimation 
model in this study. 
As Table 3.8 shows, our model seems to work fairly well, in the sense that most 
of the key variables have "correct" sign and are statistically significant.  The 
adjusted R
2
 is very large as well.  Among project attributes, Plot Ratio has a 
negative impact on the housing price, which implies that consumers do not like living 
in a very dense housing project, and developers must therefore accept a lower per unit 
price the greater the density.  Subway station proximity has a strong positive impact 
on the housing price which indicates that consumers prefer to living close to a 
subway station, and developers can charge a premium on it.  Park proximity is also 
found positively related to the housing price, however, it is not statistically significant.  
The healthcare service level (i.e., Hospital aggregate) has a significant positive 
influence on the housing price and its coefficient is very large (which shows that an 
increase of one unit of healthcare service level could increase about 21% of the 
housing unit price given our semi-log functional form, other things equal).  But 
recall that the mean value of the healthcare service level is only 0.082 given our 
calculation method, thus it is not easy to increase the weighted aggregate hospital 
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service level by one unit.
41
  In addition, the weighted aggregate of urban road 
service level influences the housing price significantly in a negative manner, which 
shows that consumers do not like living at a location that is surrounded by a very 
dense road network. 
In regard to housing unit attributes, the floor on which the housing unit is located 
has a statistically insignificant impact on the housing price.  This is somewhat 
consistent with our expectations since, based on our knowledge of the local market, 
the highest housing unit sales price for a high-rise residential building usually occurs 
in the middle of the building, particularly when the housing unit faces the inside of 
the project; however, it increases as the housing unit is located on a higher floor and 
faces the outside of the project.  Both the dummy variables of inner view and outer 
view show significantly positive influences on housing price. As expected, the 
dummy variable for adjacent to a urban road shows a significantly negative impact on 
housing price. 
In our estimation results, compared to the omitted directional dummy variable for 
facing Northwest, we have identified a strong positive impact of facing South on the 
housing price, which is consistent with our expectations. The other six directions have 
                                                             
41 Recall that the healthcare service level is calculated as the summation of 
number of beds in hospitals weighted by the distances. Given the distances 
(while a household can choose to locate close to a particular hospital, it is 
impossible to live close to all the hospitals), it would be difficult to increase 
the number of beds in the hospitals to a large degree. Hence, if the healthcare 
service level increases from 0.082 to 0.092 (a 0.01 level change), the effect on 
the per unit housing price is only 21% × 0.01 = 0.21%. 
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either positive or negative influences on the housing price.  In regard to the plane 
distance to the major open-space amenity within each housing project, we have found 
that the closer the housing unit lies to a source of major "in-project" open-space 
amenity, the higher is the housing price. 
For the housing unit area, though, the estimated coefficient is small, its t statistic 
is large, which implies price increases as the living area increases.  We know that the 
total price of a housing unit equals its unit sales price times area.  Our finding 
indicates that the size of the housing unit positively and significantly affects unit sales 
price.  What exactly is the premium? 
Consider two housing units of sizes 95 m
2
 and 110 m
2
, respectively. Assuming 
that the unit sales price of the 95 m
2
 one is 5551￥/m2.42  According to our 
estimation results, a 0.0135% increase due to the 15 m
2
 change in area would result in 
an increase of 74.9￥/m2 in the unit sales price, to 5626￥/m2.  For the 110 m2 
housing unit, the total premium due to a 15 m
2
 increase in size would be ￥84,390.43 
For the remaining explanatory variables, we find that pay-in-cash significantly 
lowers housing price compared to the mortgage payment method, which is consistent 
                                                             
42 In this example, both the area of the housing unit and its unit sales price 
are the mean values in our data set. 
43 Denoting the total price of a housing unit as TP, since the unit sales price 
PH is a function of the housing area M, we have: TP = PH(M) × M. Totally 
differentiate TP with respect to M, we have: 
dM
M
TP
M



0
 = dMMPM
M
TP
H
M



)]([ 00
0
.  In our example, M0 = 95, PH(M0) 
= 5551, and dM = 15. 
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with our expectations.  For the long term time trend, our estimation results show that 
there is a slightly positive but statistically insignificant trend of the housing price in 
the long run, which reveals that the short term fluctuation that has been taken out by 
deflating it with the monthly housing price index (HPI) explains the time effect of the 
local housing market relatively well.  In addition, the spatial lag coefficient of the 
error term is large and statistically significant.  This comes as no surprise since 
housing units within a given housing project of the high-rise pattern are very close to 
each other, which is the typical situation for residential buildings in China.
44
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we have estimated the effect of spatial heterogeneity in project and 
housing-unit attributes on the value of urban housing using retail sales data in a 
Chinese regional housing market.  We use three-dimensional distances that consider 
the floor on which the housing unit is located to form the individual spatial weight 
matrix for each housing project. 
Our estimation results show that for project attributes, the Plot Ratio and the 
weighted aggregate road service level have negative impacts on housing price, 
whereas subway station proximity and park proximity, as well as weighted aggregate 
healthcare service level, have positive impacts on housing price.  In regard to 
                                                             
44 Imagine that your housing unit is surrounded by your neighbors from front, 
back, left, and right, as well as top and bottom. 
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housing-unit attributes, our results show that the coefficients of all the view variables 
(both inner and outer) are positive, while the coefficient of the dummy variable 
showing whether the housing unit situates adjacent to a road or street is negative.  In 
addition, our results confirm the positive impact of the direction of the major rooms 
in the housing unit when facing south, which is consistent with Chinese culture.  We 
have found evidence of a positive impact of the housing unit area on its unit sales 
price, and we have obtained an insignificantly negative coefficient of the floor 
variable, which is also consistent with our expectation of the complex relationship 
between the floor and the unit sales price. For other variables, although we have 
found that payment method affects the unit sales price, our results do not suggest that 
there is a significant long term time trend in this price. 
This study contributes to the literature not only for its unique data set, but also for 
aggregate weight matrix based on 3-D distance.  However, this study could be 
extended in two ways.  One is the identification issue.  As Palmquist (1984) has 
pointed out, the cost of moving between cities would block the complete integration 
of the property markets between cities. Thus, the hedonic price parameters may vary 
in different markets even for the same set of explanatory variables.  Therefore, if we 
could obtain housing retail sales data in other cities in China (especially in those large 
cities in the southwestern region, such as Chongqing, Kunming, Guizhou, etc.), then 
we are able to compare the estimation results in this study with those at other 
markets. 
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Another issue is market segmentation. Although we consider the local housing 
market to be competitive, in fact the property developer has some pricing power 
within the boundary of its housing project.  Therefore, there may be a single offer 
function in each housing project.  Hence the estimation parameters may vary among 
different housing projects.  Therefore, if we could test whether the estimation 
parameters are equal across different housing projects, we would be able to identify 
possible market segmentation in the same regional housing market. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING OF HEDONIC PRICE PARAMETERS WITH BOTH 
 
INPUT AND OUTPUT: AN APPLICATION IN CHENGDU, CHINA 
 
Abstract 
This study focuses on the profit maximization behavior of the property developer, 
which is the key to linking the factor market (i.e., the land market) and the 
commodity market (i.e., the housing market) together.  With the true valuation of 
land derived in Chapter 2, we posit a profit function that considers all costs in the 
property development activity, including both the land cost and the non-land costs.  
A set of partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to various characteristics 
gives us the relationship between the marginal valuations in the land (factor) and 
housing (commodity) markets.  We test the theoretical relationship using a spatial 
full information maximum likelihood (SFIML), which considers the land market, the 
housing market, and the profit maximization behavior of the property developer 
together in a joint likelihood function.  Finally, we conduct hypothesis tests in both 
of these two scenarios to examine the validity of our linked-markets assumption in 
the hedonic price estimation. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this study, we focus on the profit maximization behavior of the property 
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developer, which is the key to linking the factor market (i.e., the land market) and the 
commodity market (i.e., the housing market) together.  The property developer is 
assumed to earn a positive profit arising from the premium in the English auction by 
which land is sold in China.  We posit a profit function that considers all costs of 
production, including the land cost and the non-land costs. 
A set of partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to various 
characteristics gives us the relationship between the marginal valuations in the land 
and housing markets, providing an opportunity to impose and test constraints on the 
estimated parameters.  We use a spatial full information maximum likelihood 
(SFIML), which considers the land market, the housing market, and the profit 
maximization behavior of the property developer together in a joint likelihood 
function.  We then use the results from the corresponding separate estimation in the 
housing market as a constraint on the SFIML parameters. 
The paper proceeds as follows: after reviewing the related literature, we derive a 
theoretical model based on the profit maximization behavior of the property 
developer with respect to the various characteristics of land and housing.  We then 
derive two empirical models: a separate estimation model and a joint estimation 
model.  Hypothesis tests are conducted in both of these two scenarios. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Rosen's (1974) study is often credited as the seminal work in hedonic theory. 
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Given the focus of this paper, we draw from two strands of the related literature: 
hedonic theory with both inputs and outputs, and theoretical foundations of spatial 
urban models related to local public goods.  In the first strand of literature, Heal 
(2001) and Palmquist (1989) have discussed the supply side of hedonic theory.  Heal 
(2001) extends the model by introducing imperfect competition. Heal states that in a 
competitive market for a private good, willingness to pay is not captured by sellers, 
but rather is dissipated by competition and remains with the buyers as consumers 
surplus.  He suggests that a separate market for the public good would not reach an 
efficient level of provision because of the classical free rider problem. A profit 
maximizing developer would provide a local public good at the economically optimal 
level, assuming the developer balances the tradeoff between development and 
conservation of open space.  Obviously, the trade-off shows that more development 
means more houses to sell while more open space amenities may increase the per unit 
value of the houses.  The household's willingness to pay for the change of 
open-space amenity is then derived from the indirect utility function which is the 
solution of the classical utility maximization problem. 
The core argument of Heal's study is that a market need not automatically and 
efficiently provide local public goods.  However, when the developer considers its 
profit maximization problem, it is possible that it could efficiently provide local 
public good.  This would only occur when the developer is able to develop the 
locally recognized environmental asset exclusively.  Heal considers this as a special 
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case of first-order price discrimination, which can exist only when the utility function 
is strictly concave, and the cost function is strictly convex.  In addition, the 
developer must have sole development rights.  Housing prices are positively affected 
by local environmental quality; Heal argues that if the developer is aware of that, it 
could treat the provision of environmental assets as part of its profit-maximization 
problem. 
While Rosen (1974) focuses on the different characteristics of the output, 
Palmquist (1989) extends the theory by considering the differentiated factors of 
production, with a focus on land.  Palmquist uses land as an example of 
differentiated production inputs. He assumes that the rental price of land, R, depends 
on certain characteristics associated with the land, which are denoted by zi, i=1,2,..., n, 
resulting in R = R(z1,z2,...,zn).  Palmquist assumes this differentiated factor is 
provided by a landowner and is then used in production activities. The producer's 
problem is to maximize πDV =     j × xj, subject to g(x,z,α) = 0 and π
DV   0, where 
πDV is the producer's variable profit, vector p consists of the prices of the outputs and 
non-land inputs, and g(x,z,α) = 0 is the implicit production function (vector x consists 
of outputs and inputs that could be positive or negative).  The non-land input 
demand function is given by x = x(p,z,α), and hence the producer's bid function for a 
land parcel is denoted as θ(z,p,πD,α) = π*DV(p,z,α) - πD, where πD is the desired profit 
level.  
The supply side is also similar to the Rosen's (1974) model, but the 
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characteristics are separated according to whether the landowner is able to alter them.  
Palmquist separates the characteristics vector z into two sub-vectors,   = (z1,z2,...,zi) 
and   = (zi+1, zi+2, ...,zn).   are characteristics exogenous to the landowner and the 
components of   are within its control. The problem for the landowner, therefore, is 
to maximize πS = R(    ) - C(    r,β), subject to πS   0, where πS represents the 
profit of the landowner, R(·) is the land rental price, C(·) is some cost function, r is a 
vector of input prices, and β is a vector of technology parameters.45  Therefore, the 
offer function could be given as φ(  ,  ,πS',r,β) = πS' + C(  ,  ,r,β), where πS' is the 
desired profit level of the landowner.  Finally, the combination of the bid function 
and the offer function defines the hedonic equilibrium function as the envelope of the 
tangent points, which is P = P(  ,  ,r,β). 
In the second strand of the literature, Santerre (1985) and Wu (2006) discuss the 
theoretical foundation of spatial urban models that are related to local public goods.   
Local public goods can affect nearby property values to a significant degree.  
Santerre (1985) assumes that the median voter chooses between public and private 
inputs when producing the final output of housing services.  The voter's preference 
can affect the local government's supply of local public goods.  Santerre considers a 
monocentric metropolitan area composed of a number of jurisdictions. All economic 
activities take place in the central business district (CBD), and each ring located x 
                                                             
45 By implication, besides the common input price and technology level, the 
land owner's cost depends on its "endowment"   , as well as how the land 
owner wants to "shape"   . 
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miles from the CBD corresponds to a different jurisdiction.  Voters choose housing 
service and a composite private good to maximize their utility.  In their budget 
constraint, the rental price of land, rental price of capital, the price of the composite 
private good, property tax share, money cost of travel are assumed to be functions of 
distance to the CBD. In addition, a congestion variable is introduced to represent the 
impure nature of the local public good.  The solution to the utility maximization 
problem implicitly yields the demand for local public good. 
Santerre uses data which are composed of 110 municipalities from the 11 SMSAs 
in Connecticut representing a broad range of local public goods, including local 
public education, fire, health, highway, library, parks and recreation, police, and 
sanitation service.  The estimation results strongly suggest that distance from the 
CBD influences the composition of local public goods, and the findings show that 
demand for local public fire protection, parks and recreation, police, and sanitation 
services are negatively related to distance from CBD.  In addition, Santerre 
estimates several substitution effects between residential land and different types of 
local public goods. 
Wu (2006) develops an economic foundation to analyze urban development 
patterns and their relations to community characteristics. He divides amenities into 
two categories: one is exogenous amenities, which are defined as major geographic 
features such as rivers, scenery hills, and oceans, or by the idiosyncratic history of 
development; the other category is endogenous amenities, which are defined as local 
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public services along with the location patterns of different income groups.
46
  Wu's 
basic assumptions include: a central business district (CBD) which is exogenously 
determined, households with identical incomes and preferences, and travel cost, 
which is a function of the distance between residence and CBD. Amenities are 
assumed to vary over the urban landscape, which is setup in a Cartesian coordinate 
plane centered on the CBD. 
Households are assumed to choose quantity of housing and composite goods, as 
well as the location coordinates.  The indirect utility function is fixed at an 
exogenous baseline value, after which the household's bid-rent function is identified 
implicitly from the indirect utility function.  Wu also considers the supply side of the 
housing market.  A competitive residential development industry is assumed to have 
constant-returns-to-scale production technology.  The developers choose a 
development density (defined as square feet of housing per acre of land) to maximize 
their profit, upon a location specific land rent. The zero profit condition yields the bid 
rent function for the developers. 
Wu considers two types of landscapes: one is a line-featured amenity source such 
as a river or ocean shore; the other is an area-featured amenity sources such as a lake 
or a park.  He proposes an exponential functional form to calculate the weighted 
summation of the total level of amenity at each residential site to every amenity 
source.  The bigger the size of the source, and the closer the distance to it, the higher 
                                                             
46 For example, the Forbidden City lies in the center of the city of Beijing. 
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the total amenity level.  With a Cobb-Douglas utility function, Wu numerically 
simulates the city's land use pattern with different settings of open space amenities. 
His simulation results show that while preserving land for open space removes some 
land from the path of land use, it may create incentives for even more development. 
While most hedonic studies focus solely on the consumer side of the market, the 
critical role of the property developer has long been ignored.  In fact, it is the 
property developer that links the land and housing markets together. Many studies 
just study these two markets separately.  Although the study of Palmquist (1989) and 
Wu (2006), among others, have shed light on the theoretical link between the factor 
and commodity markets, no study that we are aware of has conducted hypothesis tests 
to empirically examine this linkage in hedonic price estimation. 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
While Wu's (2006) work appears to be the standard approach for spatial urban 
models related to local public goods, it does not focus on the role played by the 
property developer as a link between the factor (i.e., land) and commodity markets 
(i.e., the housing market).  Although Palmquist (1989) points out the importance of 
combining the input and output together with respect to the differentiated 
characteristics, he does not demonstrate how to empirically test such a link.  Our 
goal in this section, therefore, is to derive a theoretical model of land and housing 
markets that is empirically testable. 
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The second and third chapters have cast some light on this issue.  The second 
chapter studies a Chinese regional land market. Given the fact that the local 
government plays the role of monopolistic land seller and English auction is used in 
the land transaction, the key feature of this chapter is to isolate the offer function of 
the seller (i.e., the local government) and the bid function of the buyers (i.e., the 
property developers), respectively.  The auction premium (i.e., the difference 
between the transaction price and the asking price proposed by the local government) 
was used to derive the distribution of the buyer's valuation and hence the market 
participants' true valuations on land. 
In addition, the third chapter studies the hedonic valuation for urban housing with 
both spatial and project heterogeneity in the same regional market.  It uses housing 
retail sales data of 6 housing projects with hundreds of housing units each.  Given 
the fact that housing development in China is relatively dense, the third chapter, 
therefore, utilizes a three-dimensional spatial weight matrix to control for spatial 
autocorrelation in the estimation of the hedonic price function.  The reason why we 
build our model upon the second and third chapters is that these chapters provide 
separate hedonic estimations of the input (i.e., land) and output (i.e., housing) in the 
same market, i.e., Chengdu, China.  If we wish to adequately link hedonic models 
for inputs and outputs together, we have to discuss them in the same market; 
otherwise the estimation results are neither consistent nor comparable. 
Henceforth, we assume that the derived true valuation of the developer is θL, and 
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the equilibrium housing retail sales price is PH.  Both θL and PH are measured in ￥/ 
m
2
.  Following the second and third chapters, we assume that θL and PH are both 
functions of various housing and project characteristics.  Thus, we write θL and PH 
in the following manner:  
θL =θL(PR,X1,X2)                                  |  (4.1) 
PH = PH (PR,H,X1,X3)                                   ( ((4.2) 
where PR is the Plot Ratio (a density ratio that is the total floor area of the 
construction divided by the area of the associated land upon which the housing 
project is located), H is floor area of the housing unit, X1 are characteristics common 
in the valuation of both land and housing, X2 and X3 are characteristics that are 
distinct in the valuation of land and housing, respectively.  PR and X1 are common 
attributes in the valuation of both land and housing; to link the input and output 
markets, we need to establish the theoretical relationship between the parameters for 
PR and X1 in both markets. 
In order to form the property developer's profit maximization problem, we need 
to introduce a cost function.  Besides the expenditure on land, we consider a 
"development cost," which includes the design, construction, administrative, and tax 
costs, etc. In order to differentiate this development cost from the land cost, we call it 
"non-land costs," denote by C
NL
 as, 
C
NL
 = C
NL
(PR,H,X1,X2,X3)                               ( (4.3) 
We consider the property developer's profit maximization problem at the 
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housing-unit (apartment) level.  At the time the land parcel is purchased, the 
developer builds several housing units at the same time, if attempting to maximize 
profit over all the housing units built on that land parcel.  We evaluate the profit 
maximization problem at the housing unit level in order to better match the retail 
sales market data for apartments.  Therefore, for each housing unit i, we can define 
the property developer's profit as: 
Πi = [PHi(PR,Hi,X1,X3) × Hi] - [PL(PR,X1,X2) × LHi] - Ci
NL
(PR,Hi,X1,X2,X3)  
                                                           |(4.4) 
where PL is a per unit actual land sales price, and LHi is the amount of land associated 
with housing unit i.  Recall that the Plot Ratio, PR, is the ratio of total floor area that 
could be built on the given land parcel divided by the area of that land.  Thus, given 
a land parcel with area L, the total floor area that could be built on the land parcel is 
simply L × PR.  Since the share of the floor area of the target housing unit is Hi / (L 
× PR), the share of the land area associated with the housing unit is then given by:
47
 
                                                             
47 The property developer does not necessarily sell all housing units in its 
housing project at the same time. Normally, it develops a housing project in 
"batches."  The developer could build housing units in some part of the land 
parcel, and sell them; then develop another part of the land parcel, etc.  
Assuming the developer sells n units of housing at a given time, the total floor 
area of these housing units is 
 
n
i 1 i
H . Obviously, the ratio of this batch of housing units to the total available 
units is  
n
i 1 i
H /(L×PR). Considering the share of the target housing unit in this 
batch of housing units, Hi / 
n
i 1 i
H , we could write the expression for LHi as: 
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LHi = L × [Hi / (L × PR)] = Hi / PR                          ((4.5) 
Eq. (4.5) is straight forward, since the amount of land associated with the housing 
unit is simply the unit's floor area divided by the Plot Ratio. 
In the second chapter, we have calculated the developer's derived valuation θL 
with an assumption of zero profit, which means that θL is the maximum amount that 
the developer would bid in the English auction.  However, if the price actually paid 
for land (PL) is less than θL, the property developer clearly anticipates a positive profit 
in its property development activity. 
Assuming that all factors of production other than land are paid according to the 
value of their marginal product, the anticipated profit from development is θL - PL, 
thus for each housing unit, the anticipated profit is (θL - PL) × LHi.  This anticipated 
profit arises from incentive incompatibility problem in the English auction, since the 
winner only needs to pay the amount at which the second highest bidder quits plus the 
last increment in the auction.  Given Eq. (4.5), we can rewrite Eq. (4.4) as follows: 
[θL(PR,X1,X2) - PL] × Hi / PR 
= PHi(PR,H,X1,X3) × Hi - PL(PR,X1,X2) × Hi / PR - Ci
NL
(PR,H,X1,X2,X3) ||||(4.6) 
In Eq. (4.6), the left hand side is the anticipated profit associated with 
development of the target housing unit.  On the right hand side, PHi(PR,Hi,X1,X3) × 
Hi is the revenue of selling housing unit i, θL(PR,X1,X2) × (Hi / PR) is the allocated 
                                                                                                                                                               
LHi = L × [ 
n
i 1 i
H /(L × PR)] × (Hi / 
n
i 1 i
H ) = Hi / PR, which is exactly the same 
as that in Eq. (4.5). 
114 
land cost for housing unit i, and Ci
NL
(PR,Hi,X1,X2,X3) is the non-land costs associated 
with development of housing unit i besides the expenditure on land.  Although we 
have no preliminary assumption about the functional form of the non-land costs Ci
NL
, 
apparently it could be solved immediately from a transformation of Eq. (4.6) as: 
Ci
NL
(PR,Hi,X1,X2,X3) = PHi(PR,Hi,X1,X3) × Hi - θL(PR,X1,X2) × (Hi / PR)| (4.7) 
Since PR>0 and Hi >0, we can rearrange Eq. (4.6) in the following manner: 
θL(PR,X1,X2) = PHi(PR,H,X1,X3) × PR - Ci
NL
(PR,H,X1,X2,X3) × PR / Hi  ((4.8) 
The property developer is assumed to be a profit maximizer, therefore, we could 
consider it to be maximizing its profit over the various characteristics.  Given our 
research problem in this paper, we are only interested in those common characteristics, 
i.e., PR and X1.  We then could differentiate Eq. (4.8) with respect to PR and X1 as 
follows: 
θL(PR,X1,X2)/PR = [PHi(PR,H,X1,X3)/PR] × PR + PHi(PR,H,X1,X3) 
 
         |- [Ci
NL
(PR,H,X1,X2,X3)/PR] × PR / Hi - Ci
NL
(PR,H,X1,X2,X3) / Hi 
                                                  (  (4.9) 
θL(PR,X1,X2)/ X1 = [PHi(PR,H,X1,X3)/ X1] × PR 
 
                 - [Ci
NL
(PR,H,X1,X2,X3)/ X1] × PR / Hi      
                                                          (4.10) 
Eqs. (4.9) and (4.10) are what we need to link the estimation parameters for the 
marginal revenue with respect to PR 
marginal cost with respect to PR 
marginal revenue with respect to X1 
marginal cost with respect to X1
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hedonic price functions both in the land and housing markets.  They are not new to 
us if we recall the case of monopolistic seller in the standard production theory.  In 
our case, though, the market is assumed to be competitive, since the prices are 
functions of the characteristics, the terms in the big bracket are nothing but the 
standard "marginal revenue minus marginal cost." 
Marginal revenue in Eq. (4.9) is composed of the sales price of the marginal 
housing unit, plus the change in the price of all housing units in response to a change 
in housing density.  Marginal costs are composed of per unit area non-land costs, 
plus the change in per unit non-land costs associated with a change in housing density.  
Eq. (4.10) is interpreted similarly for characteristics X1. 
 
4. Data 
Our study uses the same data sets used in the second and third chapters.  The 
second chapter uses a land wholesale data set in Chengdu city, China.  Chengdu is 
one of largest inland cities in mainland China.  As the capital city of Sichuan 
province, it lies in the southwestern part of China, which is about 1500 kilometers 
southwest of Beijing.  With nearly 13 million official residents, the shape of 
Chengdu is a standard monocentric city, the core metropolitan area of which consists 
of four concentric ring roads and several radius roads.  
Three hundred and fifty effective land transactions for residential development 
were recorded between January 2004 and October 2009, most of which lie between 
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the second and the third ring road (34%), and are then manually geo-coded into GIS 
coordinates.  In the land data set, we have information on transaction date, type of 
English auction, the size of the parcel, asking price by the local government, and the 
actual transaction price.
48
  We also have information on development regulations, 
such as the Plot Ratio.  In addition, for each of the land parcel, we have information 
on calculated proximity and aggregate level to different sources of open space 
amenities and local infrastructure, such as parks, rivers, subway stations, roads, and 
public hospitals.
49,50
 Descriptive statistics for this data set are contained in Tables 2.1 
and 2.2 in the second chapter. 
The housing retail sales data set used in the third chapter consists of six housing 
projects, four of which are located around the third ring road.  This data set includes 
1,268 observations in total, with an average of 211 housing units in each housing 
project.  This data set includes information on both the project and housing-unit 
attributes. Plot Ratio, Subway Station Proximity, Park Proximity, Hospital Aggregate, 
and Road Aggregate are included in the former category.  In the latter category, there 
are "view" dummies, such as whether the housing unit has a view to an open-space 
                                                             
48 The only difference between the two types of auction is the length of time 
period that the potential buyers could bid. 
49 Proximity is calculated as the distance from the centroid of a land parcel to 
the centroid of a source of open space amenity or local infrastructure using the 
Haversine Formula. 
50 Aggregate level is calculated as weight aggregate of the "service level" 
from each source of open space amenity or local infrastructure, using the 
inverse distance from centroid to centroid as the weights. The service level 
varies depending on the type of the source, such as the size of the park, the 
number of available beds in the hospital, etc. 
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amenity sources either within or outside the housing project, whether the unit is 
located adjacent to a major road, as well as the direction the housing units face.
51
  In 
addition, housing sales price, the floor number, area of the housing unit, distance to 
major open-space amenity within each project, and transaction date are also included 
in the data set as well.  Descriptive statistics for this data set are included in Tables 
3.1 and 3.2 in the third chapter. 
In this study, we need to combine the land wholesale data set and the housing 
retail sales data set together.  Unfortunately, we can only identify 4 of the 6 housing 
projects as the raw land parcels in the land data set with 350 observations (see Fig. 
4.1).  This difficulty limits us to only 3 characteristics that are common in the 
estimation of both the land and housing markets.  We therefore choose those factors 
that are both rich in economic meaning and statistically significant.  Three common 
factors include Plot Ratio, proximity to subway station, and aggregate service level of 
urban road.  Using the notation described in section 3, Plot Ratio is "PR," proximity 
to subway station and aggregate road service level are "X1."  All other explanatory 
variables in the second chapter are treated as "X2," and those in the third chapter are 
treated as "X3." 
For the four housing projects included in this study, we have 851 observations,  
                                                             
51 In the Chinese culture having the major rooms facing south (such as living 
room, main bedroom, etc.) is considered to be the most preferable direction for 
living. 
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Fig. 4.1. Spatial Distribution of Land Parcels and Housing Projects 
 
 
 
roughly 213 housing units per housing project on average over 46% of the housing 
units have a view to major open space amenities within the housing projects, 40% of 
the housing units have a view to some source of open space amenities outside the 
projects, while 34% of the housing units situate close to a major urban road.  In 
regard to the direction of the major rooms in the housing units, 17% are facing north, 
8% northeast, 19% southeast, 7% south, 2% southwest, 4% west, and 30% northwest.     
No observations faced east.  In addition, about 75% of the housing units are 
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purchased via mortgage, while 25% are paid in cash.  Descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table 4.1. 
 
5. Empirical Models 
5.1. Separate Estimation Model 
Following the semi-log functional form used in the estimations of Chapters 2 and 
3, we assume that both θL and PH have exponential forms.  Thus, we can rewrite θL 
and PH as follows:  
θL = exp(L-PR PR + L-X1 X1 + L-X2 X2)                          |(4.11) 
PH = exp(H-PR PR + H-H H + H-X1 X1 + H-X3 X3)                 |(4.12) 
where L-PR, L-X1 and L-X2 are the parameters for PR, X1 and X2 estimated in the 
second chapter, and H-PR, H-H, H-X1 and H-X3 are the parameters for PR, H, X1 and 
X3 estimated in the third chapter.  In addition, we assume that the non-land costs C
NL
, 
has a semi-log functional form with respect to various characteristics as well.  Thus, 
we have: 
C
NL
 = exp(C-PR PR + C-H H + C-X1 X1 + C-X2 X2 + C-X3 X3)        (4.13) 
However, since we only have data on 4 housing projects that could be identified as 
the raw land parcels in the land wholesale data set, we are unable to implement the 
regression on the full set of explanatory variables in Eq. (4.13).  We therefore have 
to eliminate X2 from Eq. (4.13), and hence we end up with the following functional 
form for C
NL
: 
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics for the 4-project Data Set 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Project attributes 
   
Plot Ratio 4.363 4.780 0.731 
Subway station proximity (m) 3000.556 1474.832 2419.188 
Road level 8.831 10.295 2.207 
Land unit sales price (￥/ m2) 7393.974 10574.990 4011.584 
Deflated land unit sales price (￥/ m2) 5843.329 8254.638 3112.034 
True land valuation with deflation only 
(￥/ m2) 
8063.476 9024.962 2269.026 
True land valuation with only dummy 
(￥/ m2) 
9807.723 11273.550 2959.034 
True land valuation with both deflation 
and dummy (￥/ m2) 
7557.051 8758.900 2399.368 
Housing unit attributes 
   
Distance to major open-space amenity 
within each project (m) 
212.842 99.499 257.032 
Housing unit area (m
2
) 92.469 85.730 1418.518 
Housing unit sales price (￥/ m2) 6087.727 5875.110 0.003 
Deflated housing unit sales price 
(￥/ m2) 
4519.693 4356.167 1033.613 
Floor in which the unit situates 12.800 11.000 7.750 
 
 
 
C
NL
 = exp(C-PR PR + C-H H + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3)                ((4.14) 
The corresponding regression equation in the log form is as follows: 
log(C
NL
) = αC + C-PR PR + C-H H + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3 + eC        |(4.15) 
where αC and eC, respectively, are the corresponding intercept term and random error 
component in the regression.  As pointed out in the second and third chapters, time 
is an important factor that could affect the estimation results for the cross sectional 
data covering a long period of time.  We therefore have three choices in dealing with 
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the time effect: deflation only by certain price index, either housing price index (HPI) 
or consumption price index (CPI), only time dummies, as well as a combination of 
these two approaches.  It is completely an empirical issue to determine which one to 
be the best.  In this study we implement each of these three approaches, and then 
apply the corresponding version of θL and PH to Eqs. (4.9) and (4.10), respectively.  
The results of the estimation of Eq. (4.15) are reported in Table 4.2 with deflation 
only by a monthly housing price index, in Table 4.3 with only monthly dummies but 
no deflation, and in Table 4.4 with both deflation and dummy.
52,53 
Although the regression of the non-land costs C
NL
, is an intermediate step for us 
to form the constraint that is used later in our analysis, it is worth spending some time 
discussing the coefficients values in Tables 4.2 to 4.4.  The negative sign on the 
coefficient for Plot Ratio is as expected, since the higher the housing project's density, 
the more the developer could build. Thus, it is simply an economy of scale that the 
non-land costs for each housing unit would be lower.  The positive sign of Road 
aggregate is consistent with common sense, since a location that has denser aggregate 
road service level is commonly more commercialized.  Construction in such location 
incurs higher costs than elsewhere.  For example, comparing a housing project in 
downtown with an identical housing project in a suburban area, it would be more  
  
                                                             
52 This housing price index of Chengdu is reported monthly by an authority 
called the National Development and Reform Commission. 
53 We set the monthly time trend variable, starting with January 2004 equal 
to one and ending with October 2009 equal to 70. 
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Table 4.2 
OLS Estimation of Unit Non-land Costs, C
NL
 (￥/ m2), Using HPI Deflation 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 11.884 97.534 0.000 
Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1") 
Plot Ratio  -0.441 -13.263 0.000 
ln(Subway station proximity) 0.002 0.181 0.856 
Road aggregate 0.175 56.215 0.000 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3") 
Floor  0.001 3.926 0.003 
Inner view (1=yes) 0.183 20.188 0.000 
Outer view (1=yes)  0.028 3.245 0.000 
Close to street (1=yes) 0.131 13.940 0.000 
North (1=yes) -0.067 -6.321 0.000 
North East (1=yes) -0.132 -9.038 0.000 
South East (1=yes) -0.023 -2.646 0.021 
South (1=yes) -0.078 -5.283 0.000 
South West (1=yes) -0.031 -2.591 0.005 
West (1=yes) -0.074 -4.330 0.008 
Distance to inner source -0.000 -0.819 0.132 
Housing unit area 0.010 68.374 0.000 
Pay in cash (1=yes) -0.023 -3.426 0.000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.974 
sigma^2 0.006 
Dependent variable: ln(Per unit housing cost with deflation only) 
 
 
 
costly to transport construction waste out of the city, or there may be additional fees 
charged for the noise and dust associated with the construction in the downtown area. 
Now, substitute Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12), along with (4.14), into Eqs. (4.9) and 
(4.10), we have: 
exp(L-PR PR + L-X1 X1 + L-X2 X2) × L-PR 
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Table 4.3 
OLS Estimation of Unit Non-land Costs, C
NL
 (￥/ m2), Using Monthly Time 
Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 12.461 102.011 0.000 
Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1") 
Plot Ratio  -0.429 -11.336 0.000 
ln(Subway station proximity) -0.040 -3.244 0.000 
Road aggregate 0.165 28.619 0.000 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3") 
Floor  0.002 4.390 0.000 
Inner view (1=yes) 0.178 19.541 0.000 
Outer view (1=yes)  0.029 3.305 0.000 
Close to street (1=yes) 0.129 13.740 0.000 
North (1=yes) -0.064 -6.043 0.000 
North East (1=yes) -0.135 -9.185 0.000 
South East (1=yes) -0.024 -2.680 0.012 
South (1=yes) -0.077 -5.208 0.000 
South West (1=yes) -0.032 -2.659 0.005 
West (1=yes) -0.074 -4.314 0.002 
Distance to inner source -0.000 -0.912 0.161 
Housing unit area 0.010 66.907 0.000 
Pay in cash (1=yes) -0.021 -3.160 0.000 
Time trend 0.002 1.810 0.095 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.972 
sigma^2 0.006 
Dependent variable: ln(Per unit housing cost with only dummy) 
 
 
 
= exp(H-PR PR + H-H Hi + H-X1 X1 + H-X3 X3) × H-PR PR  
    + exp(H-PR PR + H-H Hi + H-X1 X1 + H-X3 X3) 
    - exp(C-PR PR + C-H Hi + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3) × C-PR PR / Hi  
  - exp(C-PR PR + C-H Hi + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3) / Hi               (4.16) 
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Table 4.4 
OLS Estimation of Unit Non-land Costs, C
NL
 (￥/ m2), Using Both HPI Deflation 
and Monthly Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 11.870 97.366 0.000 
Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1") 
Plot Ratio  -0.474 -12.531 0.000 
ln(Subway station proximity) -0.003 -0.234 0.815 
Road aggregate 0.184 31.931 0.000 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3") 
Floor  0.002 3.964 0.000 
Inner view (1=yes) 0.183 20.173 0.000 
Outer view (1=yes)  0.028 3.256 0.001 
Close to street (1=yes) 0.132 14.052 0.000 
North (1=yes) -0.066 -6.223 0.000 
North East (1=yes) -0.134 -9.197 0.000 
South East (1=yes) -0.024 -2.735 0.006 
South (1=yes) -0.077 -5.197 0.000 
South West (1=yes) -0.032 -2.694 0.007 
West (1=yes) -0.074 -4.353 0.001 
Distance to inner source -0.000 -0.859 0.391 
Housing unit area 0.010 66.848 0.000 
Pay in cash (1=yes) -0.022 -3.398 0.001 
Time trend 0.002 1.964 0.050 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.974 
sigma^2 0.006 
Dependent variable: ln(Per unit housing cost with both deflation and dummy) 
 
 
 
exp(L-PR PR + L-X1 X1 + L-X2 X2) × L-X1 
  = exp(H-PR PR + H-H Hi + H-X1 X1 + H-X3 X3) × H-X1 PR 
 - exp(C-PR PR + C-H Hi + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3) × C-X1 PR / Hi       (4.17) 
After some rearrangement, Eqs. (4.16) and (4.17) can be rewritten as follows: 
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θL × L-PR = PHi × H-PR PR + PHi - Ci
NL
 × C-PR PR / Hi - Ci
NL
 / Hi    ((4.18) 
θL × L-X1 = PHi × H-X1 PR - Ci
NL
 × C-X1 PR / Hi                  ((4.19) 
Since Eqs. (4.18) and (4.19) hold at the per housing unit level, in order to use our 
data and implement the hypothesis test, we need to add these equations over all 
observations in our data set.  We use j to denote the j
th
 housing project, for j=1, 2, 3, 
4.  We also assume that in each of these housing projects, there are a total of nj 
housing units.  Denoting each housing unit by i, noting the fact that θL and PR vary 
among different housing projects, and the estimation parameters (i.e., the s) are 
constant across all the housing units in the data, we therefore can add up Eqs. (4.18) 
and (4.19) in the following manner: 
L-PR
 
4
1 1j
nj
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|(4.20) 
L-X1
 
4
1 1j
nj
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ij
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Denoting 
PR-L   and X1-L   as the calculated constraints on the estimation 
parameters, Eqs. (4.20) and (4.21) can be rearranged as follows: 
PR-L   
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X1-L   = {H-X1
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Table 4.5 
Summary of the Target Estimation Parameters in Land 
 
L-PR L-Road-aggregate L-Subway-proximity 
Deflation only 0.132 0.045 -0.080 
Only dummy 0.079 0.077 -0.040 
Both deflation and dummy 0.077 0.076 -0.044 
Source: The second chapter 
 
 
Table 4.6 
Summary of the Target Estimation Parameters in Housing 
 
H-PR H-Road-aggregate H-Subway-proximity 
Deflation only -0.301 -0.227 -0.595 
Only dummy -0.271 -0.200 -0.583 
Both deflation and dummy -0.299 -0.226 -0.595 
Source: The third chapter 
 
 
 
Eqs. (4.22) and (4.23) are what we need to conduct the hypothesis testing.  We, 
therefore, setup the null hypothesis as follows: 
L-PR = PR-L                                              (  (4.24) 
L-X1 = X1-L                                                 |(4.25) 
In Eqs. (4.24) and (4.25), L-PR and L-X1 are the estimation parameters in the second 
chapter, whereas 
PR-L   and X1-L   are calculated in this study in Eqs. (4.22) and 
(4.23), with H-PR and H-X1 obtained from the third chapter.  A summary of these 
target estimation parameters for land and housing from previous chapters are reported 
in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, respectively. In addition, the calculated constraints for the 
target estimation parameters are reported in Table 4.7. We therefore conduct an F test 
for each set of the constraints.  With deflation only by HPI, the calculated value of  
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Table 4.7 
Calculated Constraints for the Target Estimation Parameters 
 
L-PR L-Road-aggregate L-Subway-proximity 
Deflation only 0.2630 -1.2034 -2.0465 
Only dummy 0.3701 -1.1649 -2.0179 
Both deflation and dummy 0.3443 -1.2179 -2.0275 
 
 
 
the F statistics is 2129.6; with only monthly time dummy, the calculated value of the 
F statistics is 2888.1; with both deflation and dummy, the calculated value of the F 
statistics is 3149.5.  Given the critical value of 4.61 at 1% significance level or 3.00 
at 5% significance level, we reject the null hypothesis of the valid constraints in each 
of these three cases. 
This result should come with no surprise that, we have rejected the null 
hypothesis of equal parameters in the land estimation and in the derivation from the 
housing market.  As Ellickson (1981) has pointed out, complex relationships in the 
hedonic price function often result in the varying estimation coefficients from 
neighborhood to neighborhood. In our case, although we have 350 land parcels 
scattered throughout the city, we only have 4 housing projects that can be identified 
as the raw land parcels.  Hence, the representative power of these 4 housing projects 
could be limited or even somewhat biased with respect to the whole 350 land parcels. 
 
5.2. Joint Estimation Model 
As Ellickson (1981) has argued, the ability of hedonic theory to treat housing 
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characteristics simultaneously is obscured by one's practical approach of discussing 
one attribute at a time, while treating others as fixed.  In our case, characteristics 
from both the land market and the housing market, as well as the profit maximization 
behavior of the property developer, could have either positive or negative impacts on 
the housing sales price.  Therefore, to link the land and housing markets together, it 
is necessary to conduct an overall examination of the effect of various characteristics 
on the housing price. 
To our knowledge, few studies have been done to conduct hedonic analysis 
through joint estimation.  One of the few exceptions is Al Refai (1994).  Al Refai 
divides housing assets into land and structure, and uses an iterative three-stage least 
square (I3SLS) approach to simultaneously estimate land, structure, as well as the 
proportion of housing in total wealth.  Given the spatial nature of our research 
problem, 3SLS approach is not appropriate to us (primarily for the efficiency issue). 
We therefore turn to another joint estimation method, i.e., the full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) approach. 
Discussion of FIML dates back to Chow (1968) and Eisenpress (1962), among 
others. Since then, FIML has been applied in a wide range of studies.  We consider a 
joint estimation method that combines land market sales, housing market sales, and 
the non-land costs together, using FIML estimation. We therefore consider a joint 
probability density function fjoint(θL,PH,C
NL
), which can be rewritten via an 
application of Bayes's rule as follows: 
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fjoint(θL,PH,C
NL
) = fθL(θL) × fPH(PH|θL) × fC(C
NL|θL,PH)                      (4.26) 
Land and housing market evaluations can be considered as two independent 
processes, however, the distribution of non-land costs C
NL
 is determined by the 
linkage of the land and housing markets, as shown in Eq. (4.7).  Thus, we can 
rewrite Eq. (4.26) as: 
fjoint(θL,PH,C
NL
) = fθL(θL) × fPH(PH) × fC(C
NL|θL,PH)                         |(4.27) 
where, fθL(θL) and fPH(PH) are the probability density functions of the true land 
valuation and the housing retail sales price, respectively, and fC(C
NL|θL,PH) is the 
conditional probability density function of non-land costs, which depends upon the 
true land valuation and the housing retail sales price.  Eq. (4.7) describes a linear 
relationship among θL, PH and C
NL
, which is different from our previous models 
which used the log form of the key variables, i.e., lnθL, lnPH and lnC
NL
.  Therefore, 
for each of the three variables in our previous approach, Eq. (4.27) must be measured 
in its original form, not in log form. 
Before we proceed to derive Eq. (4.27), it is worth spending some time 
discussing the structure of the equation's three components.  From our previous 
discussion, we know that OLS estimation works fairly well for non-land costs. 
However, estimation of the housing retail sales price does best using the spatial error 
model (SEM), which is quite different from the OLS model.  The standard SEM has 
a functional form as follows: 
y = X × β + η, η = λ × W × η + e                              |(4.28) 
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where λ is the spatial lag coefficient, and W is commonly known as the spatial weight 
matrix, which is typically constructed with element i, j as the inverse distance 
between location i and j.  In this case, y - X × β is no longer the actual disturbance 
term.  Rather, η = λ × W × η + e is the true error term, which can be transformed as 
follows: 
e = (I - λ × W) × η                                |(4.29) 
Thus, η can be expressed as (I - λ × W)-1 × e, and hence we have: 
y = X × β + (I - λ × W)-1 × e                           |(4.30) 
Now again consider Eq. (4.27).  In the second chapter, the distribution of the 
true land valuation θL is transformed from the distribution of the disturbance term in 
a Tobit model estimation as follows: 
fθL(θL) = feL(θL – r − βTobit XL)                              | (4.31) 
where r is the asking price proposed by the land seller (i.e., the local government) in 
the English auction, βTobit is the vector of estimation parameters of the Tobit model, XL 
is the set of explanatory variables in the land market, and feL(·) is the probability 
density function of the disturbance term in the Tobit estimation, which is distributed 
as N(0, 2L ).  
Transforming the distribution of eL to the distribution of θL, we know that the 
mean of θL, μL, is βTobit XL + r, and the variance of θL,
2
L , is simply
2
L .  For the 
distribution of the housing retail sales price, by Eq. (4.30),we have: 
PH = XH × βH + (I - λ × W)
-1
× eH                         |(4.32) 
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where XH is the set of explanatory variables in the housing market, βH is the 
corresponding vector of housing estimation parameters, and eH is the disturbance term, 
which is distributed as N(0, 2
H ). Thus, the disturbance term can be expressed as 
follows: 
eH = (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH)                         (   (4.33) 
Transforming the distribution of eH to the distribution of PH, we know that the mean 
of PH, μH, is XH × βH, but the variance of PH, 
2
PH , is a bit more complicated to 
derive. 
From Eq. (4.32) we know that it is the term (I - λ × W)-1× eH that determine 
2
PH . Denoting P = (I - λ × W)
-1
, the i
th
 row of P× eH is then expressed as  
j
Hjij eP , 
where j denotes the j
th
 element in each row of P.  PH is a vector, hence the i
th
 
element of its variance is  
j
HijP
22  . According to the standard homoscedasticity 
assumption, we can add up all the terms and make average, and then we have: 
2
PH  = 
i j
ijH P
22 / n                                    |(4.34) 
where n denotes the number of observations in the data set. Using the property of 
trace operation, "trace (P' × P) = 
i j
ijP
2 ," Eq. (4.34) can be rewritten as follows: 
2
PH  = 
2
H  × trace(P' × P) / n 
= 2H  ×trace{[(I - λ × W)
-1
]' × (I - λ × W)-1} / n               |(4.35) 
If we define: Tr = trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1} / n, 
2
PH  can be expressed as:  
Tr × 2H .  
Turning now to the conditional distribution of non-land costs C
NL
, things become 
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more complicated.  From the relationship shown in Eq. (4.7), we can obtain the 
conditional distribution of C
NL
 by transforming the unconditional distribution of θL 
and PH, since a linear combination of two normal distributions is still a normal 
distribution.  Transforming the elements operations into matrix notation, and noting 
that there would be no covariance term due to the independence assumption of θL and 
PH, we would have the mean of C
NL
, μC, and the variance of C
NL
, 2
C , as follows: 
μC = diag(H') × XH × βH - (H ./ PR) .× (βTobit XL + r)                (4.36) 
2
C  = (H' × H / n) × Tr ×
2
H  + [(H ./ PR)' × (H ./ PR )/ n] ×
2
L        |(4.37) 
where diag(H') denotes a diagonal matrix with elements of the vector H, " ./ " and 
" .× " denote the dot operations.  Now, with the information of the mean and 
variance of θL, PH and C
NL
, we could construct the full-information log-likelihood 
function, denoted by lnL, as follows: 
lnL = [- 
2
n
× log(2 × π) - 
2
n
× log( 2L ) - 22
1
L
× (θL - μL)' × (θL - μL)] 
     + [- 
2
n
×log(2 × π) - 
2
n
× log( 2H ) 
     - 
22
1
H
× (PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH)] 
     + [- 
2
n
× log(2 × π) - 
2
n
× log( 2
C ) - 22
1
C
× (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC)] 
||                                                        ||||(4.38) 
In Eq. (4.38), μL and 
2
L  are assumed given by the second chapter, βH, λ,
2
H  are 
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treated as unknown parameters to be estimated, and μC,
2
C  are given by Eqs. (4.36) 
and (4.37).  Given the distinct spatial feature of Eq. (4.38), we call it Spatial Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (SFIML) Estimation.  Taking derivatives of lnL 
with respect to βH, λ, and 
2
H , we have the following first order conditions: 
H
L

 ln
 = 
2
1
H
× XH' ×(I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W)× (PH - XH × βH) 
    +
2
1
C
× XH' × [diag(H')]' × [Δ- diag(H')×XH × βH] = 0       |(4.39) 
where, Δ = CNL + (H ./ PR) .× (βTobit × XL + u) 

 Lln
 = 
2
1
H
× (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH) 
       - 
2
n
×
2
1
C
×



 2C  + 
42
1
C
×



 2C × (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC) = 0 ||(4.40) 
2
ln
H
L


 = - 
2
n
×
2
1
H
+
42
1
H
× (PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) 
× (PH - XH × βH) - 
2
n
×
2
1
C
×
n
HH 
× Tr 
+
42
1
C
×
n
HH 
× Tr × (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC) = 0         (|(4.41) 
Solving Eq. (4.39), we obtain the estimator for
Hˆ , as follows: 
Hˆ  = [
2
C × XHS' × XHS +
2
H × XH' ×[diag(H')]' ×diag(H') × XH]
-1
 
     × [ 2
C × XHS' × PHS +
2
H × XH' × [diag(H')]'× Δ]          (    (4.42) 
where, XHS = (I - λ × W) × XH, and PHS = (I - λ × W) × PH.  However, to solve λ 
from Eq. (4.40), we need to know 



 2C . By inspection, we have: 
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


 2C  = 
n
HH 
× 2
H ×

Tr
                                     |(4.43) 
where, Tr = trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1} / n, is defined previously. 
Obviously, deriving 

Tr
 is the key to solve λ.  Totally differentiating Tr with 
respect to λ, we have: 
dTr = 
n
1
× d{trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1}} 
       = 
n
1
× trace{{d[(I - λ × W)-1]}' × (I - λ × W)-1 
+ [(I - λ × W)-1]' × d[(I - λ × W)-1]}            ((see 54,55)((4.44) 
Since, d[(I - λ × W)-1] = - (I - λ × W)-1×d(I - λ × W) × (I - λ × W)-1 = (I - λ × W)-1×W 
× dλ× (I - λ × W)-1, we can rewrite Eq. (4.44) as:56 
dTr = 
n
1
× trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W × dλ × (I - λ × W)-1} 
        + 
n
1
× trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W × dλ × (I - λ × W)-1} 
    = 
n
2
× trace{(I - λ × W)-1 × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W × dλ} 
    = 
n
2
× trace{(I - λ × W)-1 × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W}× dλ 
(  \|(see 57,58) (4.45) 
Since dTr = 

Tr
× dλ, from Eq. (4.45), we have: 

Tr
 = 
n
2
× trace{(I - λ × W)-1 × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W}  |((4.46) 
                                                             
54 Here we use the property: d[trace(U)] = trace[d(U)], and d(U') = [d(U)]', 
where U is any matrix. 
55 Here we use the property: d(U × V) = d(U) × V + U × d(V), where U and 
V are any matrices with the appropriate dimension for matrix multiplication. 
56 Here we use the property: d(U
-1
) = - U
-1
 × d(U) ×U
-1
, where U is any 
invertible matrix. 
57 Here we use the property: trace(U × V) = trace(V ×U). 
58 Recall that λ is a scalar. 
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Now, together with Eqs. (4.43) and (4.46), we can rewrite Eq. (4.40) as follows: 

 Lln
 = 
2
1
H
× (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH) 
          - 
2
n
×
2
1
C
×
n
HH 
× 2
H ×
n
2
× Trλ 
       + 
42
1
C
×
n
HH 
× 2
H ×
n
2
× Trλ × (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC) = 0( |(4.47) 
where, Trλ = trace{(I - λ × W)
-1 
× [(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W}.  Since it is 
difficult to obtain an analytical expression for λ, we need to numerically solve for the 
estimator of ˆ . 
The estimator for 2H  is also difficult to derive.  Substituting Eqs. (4.36) and 
(4.37) into Eq. (4.41) and expanding all the terms, after some rearrangement, we 
can rewrite Eq. (4.41) as: 
[- 2 × n × (
n
HH 
)
2
 × Tr
2
] × 6H  + {- 3 × n ×
n
HH 
× Tr × Ω + (
n
HH 
)
2
 × 
Tr
2
 × Φ + 
n
HH 
× Tr × [Δ - diag(H') × XH × βH]' × [Δ- diag(H') × XH × βH]} ×
4
H  
+ [- n × Ω2 - 2 ×
n
HH 
× Tr × Ω × Φ] × 2H + Ω
2
 × Φ = 0                ( (4.48) 
where, Ω = [(H ./ PR)' × (H ./ PR) / n] × 2L , and,  
Φ = (PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH).  Now, we define: 
a = - 2 × n × (
n
HH 
)
2
 × Tr
2
                   (              (4.48a) 
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b = - 3 × n ×
n
HH 
× Tr × Ω + (
n
HH 
)
2
 × Tr
2
 × Φ + 
n
HH 
× Tr 
    × [Δ - diag(H') × XH × βH]' × [Δ- diag(H') × XH × βH]         |(4.48b) 
c = - n × Ω2 - 2 ×
n
HH 
× Tr × Ω × Φ                         (4.48c) 
d = Ω2 × Φ                                             (|(4.48d) 
With these definitions in Eqs. (4.48a) to (4.48d), the seemingly complex Eq. (4.48) is 
simply a cubic polynomial of 2H , which can be expressed as follows: 
a × ( 2H )
3
 + b × ( 2H )
2
 + c × 2H + d = 0                          (|(4.49) 
The solution of Eq. (4.49) gives us the estimator for 2H  as follows:
59
 
2ˆ
H  = 
a

6
3/1
 - 
3/1
2 3/22


a
bca
 - 
a
b
3
                           |(4.50) 
where, Γ = 36 × a × b × c - 108 × a2 × d - 8 × b3 + 12 × a × (12 × a × c3 - 3 × b2 × 
c 
2
 - 54 × a × b ×c × d + 81 × a
2
 × d
2
 + 12 × b
3 
× d)
1/2
 
Once we have obtained all the estimators of the SFIML estimation, we need to 
estimate the precision of our results. Hence we need to derive the variance - 
covariance matrix of the SFIML function.  Denoting all the estimated parameters in 
the SFIML as θ0, by the property of maximum likelihood estimators, we know that, 
asymptotically, the variance - covariance matrix would be {I(θ0)}
-1
, where I(θ0) is the 
information matrix that is defined as follows: 
                                                             
59 Theoretically, there would be three roots for a standard cubic polynomial: 
one real root and two imaginary roots. In this study, we only consider the real 
root. 
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I(θ0) = - E0[
'
ln
00
2
 
 L
]                                         |||(4.51) 
where E0 stands for the expectation of the hessian matrix evaluated at θ0.  I(θ0), 
therefore, is presented as follows (see Appendix for its proof): 
I(θ0) = 










3332
2322
11
0
0
00
II
II
I
                                         |(4.52) 
where: 
I11 = 
2
1
H
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × XH'  
     + 
2
1
C
× XH' × [diag(H')]' × [diag(H')] × XH                ((4.52a) 
I22 = trace{[(I - λ × W)
-1
]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1} 
+ 
4
42
C
H
n 



× (
n
HH 
)2 × (Trλ)
2
                            ((4.52b) 
I23 = I32 = 2
1
H
× trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W'} + 
4
2 '
C
H Tr
n
HH

 


×
n
HH 
×Trλ 
(                                                  (           |(4.52c) 
I33 = 
42 H
n
  
+ 
42 C
n

× (
n
HH 
)
2
 × Tr
2
                        ((4.52d) 
Inverting I(θ0) in Eq. (4.52), we obtain the variance - covariance matrix.  With 
this variance - covariance matrix, along with the estimators shown in Eqs. (4.42), 
(4.47) and (4.50), we can estimate our SFIML model in an iterative manner.
60
 The 
                                                             
60 On a workstation with 3.0 Ghz quad core CPU and 8 GB RAM, it takes 
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estimation results are shown in Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10, for the cases using deflation 
only by HPI, monthly time dummy, and both deflation and dummy, respectively.  
Overall, our SFIML estimation works fairly well.  The sign of the three key 
Project-Attribute Variables are all consistent with our expectation and they are all 
statistically significant.  Only one variable in the housing unit attributes, "Close to 
street (1=yes)," has a positive sign while we would expect it to be negative.  It may 
be due to the 4.project data set that has been used.
61
  For the cases using deflation 
only by HPI, monthly time dummy, and a mixed use of HPI deflation and monthly 
dummy, it appears that the mixed one performs the best in the sense that it has the 
largest log-likelihood value and smallest sum of square of the estimation residuals.  
However, the estimation coefficients and the corresponding t-values are roughly the 
same in all cases. With these estimation results, we could implement our hypothesis 
test on the validity of the linkage between the land and housing markets, as well as the 
profit-maximization behavior of the property developer.  We use the estimation 
results of the standard SEM in the separate housing market as a constraint on our 
SFIML estimation.  Since we have derived the variance - covariance matrix, a natural 
candidate for the test would be the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
about 8 to 24 hours to run one round of estimation with the step size of 0.0001 
for the three different scenarios. It would be much faster with a larger step size 
such as 0.01. 
61 If we redo the separate estimation on the housing market using standard 
SEM with the same 4-project housing data set rather than the original 
6-project one, we get the same sign in this variable. 
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Table 4.8 
SFIML Estimation of Unit Housing Retail Sales Price, PH (￥/ m
2
), Using HPI 
Deflation 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 18426.264 2.067 0.037 
Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1") 
Plot Ratio  -1378.091 -1.718 0.086 
ln(Subway station proximity) -1359.144 -1.769 0.077 
Road aggregate 293.246 1.006 0.314 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3") 
Floor  2.576 2.390 0.017 
Inner view (1=yes) 299.652 15.291 0.000 
Outer view (1=yes)  92.645 4.697 0.000 
Close to street (1=yes) 45.295 2.170 0.030 
North (1=yes) -77.571 -3.252 0.001 
North East (1=yes) -43.734 -1.262 0.207 
South East (1=yes) -2.7109 -0.142 0.887 
South (1=yes) 33.223 1.033 0.302 
South West (1=yes) -18.392 -0.666 0.506 
West (1=yes) 205.657 5.758 0.000 
Distance to inner source -0.665 -2.688 0.007 
Housing unit area 0.654 1.727 0.084 
Pay in cash (1=yes) -73.831 -5.685 0.000 
    
λ 0.990 203.235 0.000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.824 
sigma^2 21061.913 
log-likelihood -26820.193 
Dependent variable: Deflated per unit housing retail sales price 
 
 
 
We set H0 as "estimation parameters of the separate SEM models in housing 
market are valid constraints on the estimation parameters of SFIML."  Denoting 
HRˆ  
as the constraint, we can express the LM statistic as follows: 
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Table 4.9 
SFIML Estimation of Unit Housing Retail Sales Price, PH (￥/ m
2
), Using Monthly 
Time Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 26730.837 2.164 0.030 
Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1") 
Plot Ratio  -1857.599 -1.671 0.095 
ln(Subway station proximity) -2021.866 0.815 0.415 
Road aggregate 329.139 -1.900 0.057 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3") 
Floor  4.583 3.069 0.002 
Inner view (1=yes) 399.713 14.721 0.000 
Outer view (1=yes)  122.882 4.496 0.000 
Close to street (1=yes) 67.815 2.340 0.019 
North (1=yes) -102.711 -3.101 0.002 
North East (1=yes) -85.622 -1.778 0.075 
South East (1=yes) -17.712 -0.668 0.504 
South (1=yes) 41.176 0.924 0.356 
South West (1=yes) -38.296 -1.000 0.317 
West (1=yes) 265.153 5.358 0.000 
Distance to inner source -0.909 -2.651 0.008 
Housing unit area 0.845 1.600 0.110 
Pay in cash (1=yes) -89.862 -4.993 0.000 
Time trend 1.951 0.673 0.501 
λ 0.990 203.235 0.000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.805 
sigma^2 40426.258 
log-likelihood -27546.491 
Dependent variable: Per unit housing retail sales price 
 
 
 
LM = {
2
1
H
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × HRˆ ) + 2
1
C
× XH' × 
[diag(H')]' × [Δ - diag(H') × XH × HRˆ }' × {I( HRˆ )}
-1
 × {
2
1
H
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I -  
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Table 4.10 
SFIML Estimation of Unit Housing Retail Sales Price, PH (￥/ m
2
), Using Both 
HPI Deflation and Monthly Dummy 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 18265.178 2.049 0.040 
Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1") 
Plot Ratio  -1396.282 -1.741 0.082 
ln(Subway station proximity) -1351.383 -1.760 0.078 
Road aggregate 301.562 1.035 0.301 
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3") 
Floor  2.595 2.408 0.016 
Inner view (1=yes) 299.412 15.281 0.000 
Outer view (1=yes)  92.455 4.688 0.000 
Close to street (1=yes) 46.378 2.218 0.027 
North (1=yes) -76.152 -3.186 0.001 
North East (1=yes) -45.872 -1.320 0.187 
South East (1=yes) -3.249 -0.170 0.865 
South (1=yes) 33.757 1.050 0.294 
South West (1=yes) -19.351 -0.700 0.484 
West (1=yes) 205.136 5.744 0.000 
Distance to inner source -0.669 -2.703 0.007 
Housing unit area 0.616 1.618 0.106 
Pay in cash (1=yes) -73.522 -5.661 0.000 
Time trend 1.835 0.877 0.380 
λ 0.990 203.235 0.000 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.829 
sigma^2 21052.352 
log-likelihood -26813.661 
Dependent variable: Deflated per unit housing retail sales price 
 
 
 
λ × W) × (PH - XH × HRˆ ) + 2
1
C
× XH' ×[diag(H')]' × [Δ - diag(H')× XH × HRˆ }  (4.53) 
As a result, the values of the LM statistics are 0.411, 0.338, and 0.262 for the cases 
using HPI deflation, monthly time dummy, and both HPI deflation and monthly 
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dummy, respectively.  Therefore, it fails to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level for all cases. 
We consider the "fail to reject" results in the LM test as a positive signal in this 
study.  For the separate estimation in the housing market using standard SEM 
approach, we have imposed no information about the land market, nor the profit 
maximization behavior of the property developer.  However, the property 
development activity is a complete process in the sense that it incorporates the factor 
market (i.e., the land market), the commodity market (i.e., the housing market), as 
well as the profit maximization behavior all together. There has to be a way, at least in 
the theoretical level, to link them together with respect to the various characteristics 
that could be capitalized in the housing price.  Our SFIML approach, as shown 
above, has successfully linked these three components together, from theory to 
empirical practice.  Essentially, the "fail to reject" results in the hypothesis test (i.e., 
the LM test) have statistically proved our theoretical assumption using real world data; 
the results have also demonstrated the validity and robustness of the hedonic theory 
with both input and output.  In addition, since the property developer acquires raw 
land parcels via English auction, our approach has also shown that the derived true 
valuation of land works fairly well with the SFIML estimation, which has confirmed 
and justified the use of the derived true valuation in the hedonic price estimation. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we have demonstrated two methods to implement the hypothesis 
test on the hedonic price estimation with both input and output, which has been 
applied to a Chinese regional land market and housing market.  We focus on the 
profit maximization behavior of the property developer, which is the key role to link 
the factor market (i.e., the land market) and the commodity market (i.e., the housing 
market), as well as the profit maximization behavior in the property development 
activity.  Although the housing market is assumed to be competitive and no 
economic profit exists, a positive profit is allowed from the premium due to the 
difference between the buyer's true valuation and the actual sales price in the English 
auction where the raw land parcel is traded with the local government. With the 
developer's true valuation of land derived in Chapter 1, we have calculated a non-land 
costs in the property development process aside from the land cost. 
Two methods are employed to conduct the hypothesis test.  A set of partial 
derivatives of the profit function with respect to various characteristics give us the 
relationship between the marginal valuations in the land and housing markets, which 
then present us the link between the estimation parameters in these two markets, and 
also play the role as constraints on the estimation parameters.  We also use a joint 
estimation approach which considers the land market, the housing market and the 
property developer's profit maximization behavior all together in the estimation.  We 
then use the results in the corresponding separate estimation in the housing market as 
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constraints on the parameters.  In the separate estimation model, our results reject 
the null hypothesis that the calculated constraints are valid, but it is highly possible to 
be due to the fact that our limited number of housing projects in the data set might be 
a poor representative of all the land parcels, since the hedonic parameters may vary 
from neighborhood to neighborhood as Ellickson (1981) has pointed out.  In the 
joint estimation model, our results fail to reject the null hypothesis, which we 
consider to be a positive signal to confirm and justify the theoretical linkage (i.e., our 
linked markets assumption) in the hedonic price estimation. 
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Derivation of the Information Matrix (4.52) 
Now, let's look at the derivation of the information matrix, I(θ0), in the SFIML.  
In order to obtain the information matrix, the first step is to derive the hessian matrix 
of lnL.  While some of the second order derivatives are straight forward to obtain, 
some are a bit more complex to derive.  The second order condition for βH is 
relatively straight forward to derive. Differentiating Eq. (4.40) with respect to βH, we 
have: 
2
2 ln
H
L


 = - 
2
1
H
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × XH 
        - 
2
1
C
× XH' × [diag(H')]' × [diag(H')] × XH               ||(A.1) 
The second order condition for λ is difficult to obtain. Noting that both 
2
C  and  
Trλ are functions of λ, by chain rule, we have: 
2
2 ln

 L
 = - 
2
1
H
× (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × W × (PH - XH × βH) 
        + (
4
2
C
H


×



 2C ×
n
HH 
× Trλ - 2
2
C
H


×
n
HH 
×



Tr
) 
 
        - 
6
22
C
H


×



 2C ×
n
HH 
×
n
1
× Trλ × (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC) 
        + 
4
2
C
H


×
n
HH 
×
n
1
×



Tr
× (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC)          (A.2) 
where, 



 2C
 
= 
n
HH 
× 2H ×
n
2
× Trλ, as shown in Eqs. (4.43) and (4.46).  To obtain 



Tr
, denoting ζ = I - λ × W, and totally differentiating Trλ with respect to λ, we have: 
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d{trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W]} = trace{d[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W]} 
= trace[d(ζ-1) × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W] + trace{ζ-1 × [d(ζ-1)]' × ζ-1 × W} 
   + trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × d(ζ-1)× W] 
= trace[- ζ-1 × d(ζ) × ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W] 
  + trace{- ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × [d(ζ)]' × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W}  
  + trace[- ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × d(ζ) × ζ-1× W]                 |     (A.3) 
Noting that d(ζ) = d(I - λ × W) = - W × dλ, and using properties "trace(A × B) = 
trace(B × A)" and "trace(A) = trace(A')," after rearrangement, Eq. (A.3) can be 
rewritten as: 
dTrλ = trace[ζ
-1
 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × W] × dλ 
      + trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × W' × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W] × dλ 
      + trace[ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1× W] × dλ                 (A.4) 
Therefore, we have: 



Tr
 = trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × W] 
+ trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × W' × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W] 
      + trace[ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1× W]                     |(A.5) 
Substituting 



 2C  and Eq. (A.5) into Eq. (A.2), we have:  
2
2 ln

 L
 = - 
2
1
H
× (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × W × (PH - XH × βH) 
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       + (
4
2
C
H


×
n
HH 
× 2
H ×
n
2
× Trλ ×
n
HH 
× Trλ - 
2
2
C
H


×
n
HH 
× Trλλ)
 
   - 
6
22
C
H


×
n
HH 
× 2
H ×
n
2
× Trλ ×
n
HH 
×
n
1
× Trλ × (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC) 
        + 
4
2
C
H


×
n
HH 
×
n
1
× Trλλ× (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC)          (A.6) 
where, Trλλ = trace[ζ
-1
 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × W] + trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × W' × (ζ-1)' × 
ζ-1 × W] + trace[ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1× W], and ζ = I - λ × W, as shown in Eq. 
(A.5). 
The second order condition for 2H  is shown as follows: 
22
2
)(
ln
H
L


 = 
42 H
n
  
- 
6
1
H
× (PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) 
× (PH - XH × βH) +
42 C
n

× (
n
HH 
)
2
 × Tr
2
 
- 
6
1
C
× (
n
HH 
)
2
 × Tr
2
 × (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC)          | |(A.7) 
The cross-second-order conditions of 
2
2 ln
H
L


 
(= 
 

2
2 ln
H
L
) and
 

H
Lln2
 
(= 
H
L

 ln2
) 
are shown in Eqs. (A.8) and (A.9), respectively, as follows: 
2
2 ln
H
L


 = 
 

2
2 ln
H
L
 = - 
4
1
H
× XH ' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH) 
       - 
4
1
C
×
n
HH 
× Tr × XH' × [diag(H')]' × [Δ - diag(H') × XH × βH] 
(|                                               (A.8) 
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 

H
Lln2
 = 
H
L

 ln2
 = - 
2
2
H
× XH' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH) 
        - 
4
2
C
×
n
HH 
× 2
H ×
n
1
× Trλ ×XH' × [diag(H')]' × (C
NL
 - μC)(  |(A.9) 
The cross-second-order condition of 
2
2 ln
H
L


 (= 
 

2
2 ln
H
L
) is a bit more 
complicated. Noting that "
2
)(
V
dVUVdU
V
U
d

 ," along with the chain rule, we have: 
2
2 ln
H
L


 = 
 

2
2 ln
H
L
 
= - 
4
1
H
× (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH) 
        - 
4
22 '
C
HC Tr
n
HH

 


×
n
HH 
× Trλ 
        + 
6
22 '2
C
HC Tr
n
HH

 


×
n
HH 
×
n
1
× Trλ × (C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC) 
                               (                          (A.10) 
Now, we take expectation on Eqs. (A.1), (A.6), (A.7) to (A.9), and (A.10).  
Every term in Eq. (A.1) is non-stochastic, hence its expectation remains the same. 
Thus,  
E0[ 2
2 ln
H
L


] = - 
2
1
H
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × XH' 
           - 
2
1
C
× XH' × [diag(H')]' × XH' × [diag(H')]'         ( ((A.11) 
To obtain E0[ 2
2 ln

 L
], we need to make expectation on each of the four terms in Eq. 
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(A.6) one by one.  For the first term which we denote by 
1
2
2 ln

 L
, "- 
2
1
H
× (PH - XH 
× βH)' × W' × W × (PH - XH × βH)," we need to substitute PH - XH × βH = (I - λ × 
W)
-1
 × eH from Eq. (4.33) into it, as follows: 
1
2
2 ln

 L
 = - 
2
1
H
× eH' × [(I - λ × W)
-1
]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1 × eH (||(A.12) 
Denoting M = W × (I - λ × W)-1, by inspection, the element in the ith row of the vector 
M × eH is  
n
j
Hjij eM , where j denotes the j
th
 element in the i
th
 row of the matrix M. 
Therefore, the matrix multiplication (M × eH)' × (M × eH) can be expressed as 
  
n
i
n
j
Hjij eM
2)( .  Taking expectation on (M × eH)' × (M × eH), we have: 
E0[  
n
i
n
j
Hjij eM
2)( ] =   
n
i
n
j
Hjij eME ])[(
2
0                     |(A.13) 
Noting the fact that ][0  
n
j
Hjij eME  = 0, using the definition of variance, Eq. 
(A.13) can be rewritten as follows: 
  
n
i
n
j
Hjij eME ])[(
2
0  =   
n
i
n
j
Hjij eMVar ][0  =   
n
i
n
j
HijM )(
22   
= 
n
i
n
j
ijH M
22  = 2H × trace(M' × M)  ( ||(A.14) 
Therefore, combining Eqs. (A.12) and (A.14), we have: 
E0[
1
2
2 ln

 L
] = - trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1}       |(A.15) 
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The second term of Eq. (A.6), 
2
2
2 ln

 L
, is non-stochastic, hence, its 
expectation remains the same, i.e., 
E0[
2
2
2 ln

 L
] = 
4
42
C
H
n 



× (
n
HH 
)2 × (Trλ)
2 - 
2
2
C
H


×
n
HH 
× Trλλ      || (A.16) 
Realizing the fact that, 
E0[(C
NL
 - μC)' × (C
NL
 - μC)] = n×
2
C                               (A.17) 
The expectation of the third and fourth terms of Eq. (A.6), i.e., 
3
2
2 ln

 L
 and 
4
2
2 ln

 L
, 
can be expressed in Eqs. (A.18) and (A.19), respectively, as follows: 
E0[
3
2
2 ln

 L
] = - 
4
44
C
H
n 



× (
n
HH 
)2 × (Trλ)
2
                       |(A.18) 
E0[
4
2
2 ln

 L
] = 
2
2
C
H


×
n
HH 
× Trλλ                              (|(A.19) 
Adding up Eqs. (A.15), (A.16), (A.18), and (A.19), we have: 
E0[ 2
2 ln

 L
] = - trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1} 
           + (
4
42
C
H
n 



× (
n
HH 
)2 × (Trλ)
2 - 
2
2
C
H


×
n
HH 
× Trλλ) 
           - 
4
44
C
H
n 



× (
n
HH 
)2 × (Trλ)
2 + 
2
2
C
H


×
n
HH 
× Trλλ 
         = - trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1} 
           - 
4
42
C
H
n 



× (
n
HH 
)2 × (Trλ)
2
                         |(A.20) 
Realizing the fact that the term E0[eH' × eH] is nothing but n×
2
H , we have:  
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E0[(PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W)× (PH - XH × βH)] = n×
2
H   
\                                                         |(A.21) 
Therefore, considering Eqs. (A.17) and (A.21), when taking expectation, Eq. (A.7) 
can be transformed as: 
E0[ 22
2
)(
ln
H
L


] = - 
42 H
n
  
- 
42 C
n

× (
n
HH 
)
2
 × Tr
2
                  (A.22) 
Noting the fact that E0[PH - XH × βH] = (I - λ × W)
-1
 × E0[eH] = 0, and also 
E0[C
NL
 - μC] = 0, from Eq. (A.8) we have: 
E0[ 2
2 ln
H
L


] = E0[
 

2
2 ln
H
L
] = 0                              ( ( (  (A.23) 
In a similar manner, from Eq. (A.9), we have:
 
E0[
 

H
Lln2
] = E0[
H
L

 ln2
] = 0                              (   ((A.24) 
The expectation of 
2
2 ln
H
L


 (= 
 

2
2 ln
H
L
) is relatively more complicated than the 
previous two. Again, by Eq. (4.33), we can rewrite the first term of Eq. (A.10), which 
we denote by 
1
2
2 ln
H
L


, as follows: 
1
2
2 ln
H
L


 = - 
4
1
H
× eH' × [(I - λ × W)
-1
]' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (I - λ × W)-1 × eH 
       = - 
4
1
H
× eH' × [(I - λ × W)
-1
]' × W'
 
× eH
                      
  ( (A.25) 
Denoting Q = W', along with the notation of P = (I - λ × W)-1, by inspection, the 
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element in the i
th
 row of the vector P × eH is  
n
j
Hjij eP , and the element in the i
th
 
row of the vector Q ×eH is  
n
j
Hjij eQ , where j denotes the j
th
 element in the i
th
 row 
of the matrix P and Q respectively. Therefore, we can express the matrix 
multiplication (P ×eH)' × (Q ×eH) as: 
 (P × eH)' × (Q × eH) = )]()[(   
n
j
Hjij
n
i
n
j
Hjij eQeP             |(A.26) 
In order to take expectation on Eq. (A.26), we note the fact that 
][0  
n
j
Hjij ePE  = 0, and also ][0  
n
j
Hjij eQE  = 0. Then, with the definition of 
covariance, we have: 
)]}()[({0   
n
j
Hjij
n
i
n
j
Hjij eQePE  = )]()[(0   
n
j
Hjij
n
i
n
j
Hjij eQePE  
= ),(0   
n
j
Hjij
n
i
n
j
Hjij eQePCov  =   
n
i
n
j
n
j
HjijHjij eQePCov })],([{ 0  
=   
n
i
n
j
n
j
HjHjijij eeCovQP })],([{ 0  =   
n
i
n
j
n
j
Hijij QP ])([
2  
=  
n
i
n
j
ijijH QP )(
2  
= )'(2 QPtraceH            (               |(see 62,63,64,65) (A.27) 
                                                             
62 Here we use the property:  
n
i
m
j
ji
m
j
j
n
i
i YXCovYXCov )],([),( . 
63 Here we use the property: ),(),( YXCovbaYbXaCov  . 
64 Here we use the property:  
n
j
j
n
j
n
j
j XX )()( . 
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Therefore, when taking expectation, Eq. (A.25) can be rewritten as follows: 
E0[
1
2
2 ln
H
L


] = - 
2
1
H
× trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W'}                  (A.28) 
The second term of Eq. (A.10), 
2
2
2 ln
H
L


, is non-stochastic, hence, we have: 
E0[
2
2
2 ln
H
L


] = - 
4
22 '
C
HC Tr
n
HH

 


×
n
HH 
× Trλ                 || (A.29) 
In addition, by Eq. (A.17), the third term of Eq. (A.10), 
3
2
2 ln
H
L


, when taking 
expectation, can be expressed as follows: 
E0[
3
2
2 ln
H
L


] = 
4
22 '2
C
HC Tr
n
HH

 


×
n
HH 
× Trλ                 (A.30) 
Adding up Eqs. (A.28) to (A.30), we finally have: 
E0[ 2
2 ln
H
L


] = E0[
 

2
2 ln
H
L
] = -
2
1
H
× trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' 
                       -
4
2 '
C
H Tr
n
HH

 


×
n
HH 
×Trλ            |(A.31) 
Now we have all the information we need to form the information matrix, 
which we denote as I(θ0).  Substituting Eqs. (A.11), (A.20), (A.22) to (A.24) and 
(A.31) into Eq. (4.53), we have: 
                                                                                                                                                               
65 Here we use the property:  
n
i
n
j
ijij baBAtrace )()'( . 
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Q.E.D. 
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